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INTRODUCTION
Recent contributions to the literature in the fields of economics
and psychology establish that the way in which a problem, question, or
dilemma is presented to individuals may affect their responses. So-
called "framing effects" may result in deviations from what economists
would call a "rational" response to a problem.
The legal literature has recognized the importance of this behav-
ioral law and economics innovation (among others). If people act ir-
rationally because of framing effects, then legal rules designed based
upon the expectation that people will react in an economically ra-
tional way to them will not be effective.2 Indeed, legal rules ought to
be designed with behavioral law and economic insights-including
framing effects-in mind.
But the legal literature has yet to consider the possibility that pub-
lic perception of different types of regulatory instruments, as influ-
enced by framing effects, may have an impact on instrument choice.
Framing effects may render instruments subject to criticism to which
other, competing instruments are not subject, even if in economic re-
ality-i.e., framing effects to the side-the competing instruments
could be subjected to the same criticism.
In this Article, I argue that framing effects can indeed play a role
in rendering certain regulatory instruments more subject to criticism,
and therefore less viable. As a case study, I use the question of envi-
ronmental regulatory instrument choice. This focus is appropriate in
light of the gulf between favorable theoretical evaluations of market-
based regulation on the one hand, and generally negative public per-
ceptions of market-based regulation and the suboptimal usage of mar-
ket-based regulatory instruments on the other. The academic
popularity of market-based regulation has not translated into wide-
spread implementation of market-based instruments. This is the re-
sult in large part of successfully organized opposition to market-based
regimes. Opponents of market-based regimes tend to raise two re-
lated, but distinct, arguments against them. First, it is often asserted
that market-based regulatory instruments should be rejected because
they give rise to a "right to pollute." Second, opponents argue
1 See infra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
3 See infra Part II1.A.
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against market-based regimes on the ground that they wrongly "coin-
modify" the environment. 4
In reality, virtually all environmental regulatory regimes can
properly be subjected to versions of both these critiques. Nonethe-
less, the "right to pollute" and "commodification" critiques persist as
effective challenges, particularly to market-based regulatory schemes.
I suggest three frame-related reasons for the critiques' ongoing vitality
with respect to market-based regulation. First, market-based regula-
tions tend to emphasize the role of private actors and to minimize the
role of the government. Second, market-based regulations are seen to
separate pollution from the underlying benefit of the activity that re-
sults in pollution generation. Third, market-based regulations are
seen to confer rights upon, rather than to take rights away from,
polluters.
These three factors result in market-based regulatory forms'
heightened susceptibility to the "right to pollute" and "commodifica-
tion" critiques. In effect, the critiques' applicability is at least in part a
framing effect.
This conclusion is important on two levels. First, with respect to
environmental regulatory instrument choice, understanding the criti-
ques as the results of framing helps to explain continued reliance
upon command-and-control regulation despite widespread endorse-
ment of market-based instruments. It also suggests that changes to
the market-based instruments' frame might reduce framing effects,
thereby making those instruments more palatable.
Second, on a broader level, the analysis with respect to environ-
mental regulation suggests that framing effects may affect instrument
choice in general. Along similar lines, understanding commodifica-
tion of the environment as at least in part a framing effect may shed
light on the proper scope of the "commodification" critique: when,
exactly, is it wrong for a legal regime to "commodify" what had not
previously been a commodity?
This Article proceeds as follows. First, in Part I, I describe the
contributions of behavioral law and economics literature, and then
focus on the notion of framing effects. In Part II, I provide an over-
view of the regulatory tools generally available to environmental regu-
lators. In Part III, I elucidate the "right to pollute" and
"commodification" critiques as applied to environmental regulation.
In Part IV, I analyze the economically proper scope of the "right to
pollute" and "commodification" critiques with respect to environmen-
tal regulatory instruments.
4 See infra Part III.B.
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In Part V, I first describe the differing frames of various environ-
mental regulatory tools. I then describe how those differing frames
give rise to framing effects that are likely to affect public perception of
and reaction to different regulatory tools. In Part VI, I assess the pros-
pect for refraining as a means to defuse objections to the introduction
of market-based regulation. I conclude by outlining broad lessons
that might be taken, as well as possible avenues for future research.
I. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS AND FRAMING EFFEcTs
In this Part, I present an overview of behavioral law and econom-
ics. I then focus on one insight of behavioral law and economics:
framing effects.
Basic economic analysis of law rests upon the traditional eco-
nomic assumption that actors act in their economic self-interest. Em-
pirical evidence indicates, however, that this assumption is in many
cases not justified: human behavior, in other words, diverges from
what pure economic self-interest as a motivation might suggest.5 Be-
havioral law and economics seeks to improve the predictive power of
traditional law and economics by incorporating behavioral considera-
tions into the model. 6
Framing effects are one example of an observable behavioral trait
for which the traditional "rational actor" model does not allow. As
expounded by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, the precise way
in which a problem or choice is presented-i.e., its frame-may affect
the decisionmaker's perception of the problem or choice, and ulti-
mately the decisionmaker's preference. 7
The relevance of framing turns upon another concept critical to
behavioral law and economics: Tversky and Kahneman's ground-
breaking work on prospect theory.8 Prospect theory asserts two funda-
5 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REv.
205, 207 (2001) (noting that most people "behave like homo sapiens, not like homo
economicus" (citing Richard H. Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2000, at 133)); see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1476-81 (1998) (identifying and discussing
differences between "homo economicus" and "real people").
6 See, e.g., BEHAViORAL LAW AND ECONOMtcS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000);Jolls et
al., supra note 5, at 1476-81; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behav-
ioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv.
1051, 1074-75 (2000).
7 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453 (1981) (explaining framing effects and their signifi-
cance to rational-choice theory).
8 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames [herein-
after Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames], in CHOICES, VALUES, AND
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mental ways in which people perceive options differently than the ra-
tional actor model would predict. First, people value a loss of a
certain amount more negatively than the positive value they associate
with a gain of the same amount. Second, people tend to overweight
low probabilities and to underweight moderate and high probabilities,
with the latter effect being more pronounced than the former,
The validity of prospect theory suggests the importance of fram-
ing. As Tversky and Kahneman explain, if people valued gains and
losses equally and perceived probabilities exactly as they actually are,
then framing would not matter. But, insofar as they do not, "different
frames can lead to different choices." 9 A simple example is that "the
possible outcomes of a gamble can be framed either as gains and
losses relative to the status quo or as asset positions that incorporate
initial wealth."' 0
There are, in effect, two aspects to framing effects: people's natu-
ral tendencies in formulating frames-so-called "mental account-
ing"' '-and the ability of someone who is propounding an option to
present the option-i.e., to frame it-in such a way as to take advan-
tage of framing effects and make the option seem more or less desira-
ble.12 The fact that the frame in which an option is presented may be
FRAMES 1 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AN)
FRAMES, supra, at 17; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra, at 44
(developing an updated version of prospect theory that looks not just at risky pros-
pects, but also at uncertain prospects to predict preferences for those prospects).
9 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 454. Technically, the importance of
framing rests upon the nonlinearity of the perceived value and perceived probability
functions that prospect theory predicts. See id.; see also Richard H. Thaler, Mental
Accounting Matters, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at 241, 244 (noting
as "important features" of Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory with respect to
mental accounting that (i) "[t]he value function is defined over gains and losses rela-
tive to some reference point," (ii) "[b]oth the gain and loss functions display dimin-
ishing sensitivity," and (iii) the theory respects the concept of loss aversion (emphasis
omitted)).
For discussions of the effects of framing on behavior, see, for example, Eric J.
Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, in CHoIcEs, VAL-
UES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at 224, 225 (analyzing the effects of possibility assess-
ments and perceptions of loss on consumers' decisions about insurance); Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 7, at 454-55; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at
209, 215-18.
10 Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 8, at 4.
11 See Thaler, supra note 9, at 248-68.
12 See id. at 245-46 (describing "principles of hedonic framing, that is, the way of
evaluating joint outcomes to maximize utility," and suggesting ways in which market-
2oo6]
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chosen deliberately with an eye toward affecting 
its perception is a
point to which I return below, in the context of the 
possible use of
education to correct economically inaccurate perceptions.'
3
Tversky and Kahneman identify three particular types 
of framing
that can result in actions that are anomalous if evaluated 
under the
rational actor model standard: framing of acts, framing 
of contingen-
cies, and framing of outcomes.
1 4 Framing of acts refers to the ques-
tion of whether two decisions are presented independently 
or in
tandem.15 Framing of contingencies refers to whether 
a possibility is
presented as more or less contingent or certain.
1 6 Framing of out-
comes refers to whether outcomes are presented as 
gains or losses in
respect of the status quo.
17
ers might take advantage of it); id. at 246-48 (discussing the 
divergence between "he-
donic framing" and actual framing tendencies).
13 See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
14 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 453-54.
15 See id. at 454-55.
16 See id. at 456-57.
17 See id. Kahneman and Tversky define a 
"psychological account"-later re-
ferred to in the literature as a "mental account," 
Thaler, supra note 9, at 244,-as "an
outcome frame which specifies (i) the set of elementary outcomes 
that are evaluated
jointly and the manner in which they are combined and (ii) a reference 
outcome that
is considered neutral or normal." Id. (citing Tversky & Kahneman, 
supra note 7, at
456). As Thaler explains, the reference point is typically the 
status quo. Id.
In a subsequent article, Kahneman and Tversky identified 
three different ways in
which outcomes might be framed: as a minimal account, 
as a topical account, and as a
comprehensive account. See Kahneman & Tversky, 
Choices, Values, and Frames, supra
note 8, at 11. Thaler elucidates:
Comparing two options using the minimal account 
entails examining only
the differences between the two options, disregarding 
all their common fea-
tures. A topical account relates the consequences 
of possible choices to a
reference level that is determined by the context 
within which the decision
arises. A comprehensive account incorporates 
all other factors including
current wealth, future earnings, possible outcomes 
of other probabilistic
holdings, and so on.
Thaler, supra note 9, at 244-45. While "[elconoinic theory 
generally assumes that
people make decisions using the comprehensive 
account," id., Kahneman and Tver-
sky suggest that in fact people tend to evaluate 
acts in terms of a "minimal account,"
which includes only the direct consequences of the 
act, Kahneman & Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, supra note 8, at 11.
Other commentators have devised another typology 
of so-called "valence fram-
ing" (that is, framing that describes options in positive or negative 
terms). See Irwin P.
Levin et al., All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology 
and Critical Analysis of Framing
Effects, 76 ORG. BEI-AV. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 149, 150 
(1998) (dividing valence
framing into "risky choice framing," "attribute framing," 
and "goal framing" (empha-
sis omitted)).
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The legal literature has recognized the importance of this behav-
ioral law and economics innovation (among others). Commentators
have recognized that if people act irrationally because of framing ef-
fects, then legal rules that. are designed to anticipate economically ra-
tional responses from societal actors may not function as expected.'3
Other commentators have relied upon framing effects to argue that
societal actors' responses to different types of legal rules may differ
even if the rules are economically indistinguishable.1 9 And commen-
tators have also recognized that framing effects may influence bar-
gaining undertaken with the potential application of a legal rule
lurking in the background. 20
Absent from the legal literature, however, is analysis of the extent
to which public perception of competing regulatory options-as influ-
enced by how the public is likely to see the options as being framed-
might affect the viability of those options. 2' Such an analysis differs
from extant studies involving framing effects insofar as the hypothesis
I advance here suggests that a regulatory regime's framing effects
18 See, e.g., Edward McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspective on Pain
and Suffering Awards, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 259, 276.
19 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules,
in BFAvioRAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 288, 294-98 (arguing that fram-
ing effects may result in a redistributive legal rule having less of a distortional effect
on the work incentives of those benefited and burdened by the rule than a tax rule,
even if the two rules are economically identical).
20 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV.
L. RE'. 2463, 2514-15 (2004) (discussing framing effects on plea bargaining).
21 Cf David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1330 (2003) ("There is little discussion in the behavioral eco-
nomics literature of what relevance, if any, biases affecting individual choice have in
the context of political decisionmaking and outcomes."); Daryl J. Levinson, Framing
Transactions in Constitutional Law, 11 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 n.2 (2002) ("This Article
does not explore the connection between the psychology of individual decisionmak-
ing and the law's approach to framing transactions, although the intriguing connec-
tion is well worth noticing."). Dana explains the connection between individuals'
cognitive biases and political results. First, politicians will tend to respond to public
opinion, which in turn may be influenced by cognitive biases. Dana, supra, at 1330.
Second, from an interest group perspective, Dana argues that "cognitive biases matter
because they may affect the vigor with which a given interest group mobilizes and how
much it therefore will invest in the political process in order to secure a favorable
outcome." Id. at 1331. In addition, it seems that environmental political entrepre-
neurs will have an easier, and cheaper, time mobilizing public opinion where it is
possible to feed into cognitive biases. Cf Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to the
Implementation of Emissions Markets: Lessons from RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645,
664-67 (2000) (describing how "political entrepreneurs" harnessed public opposition
to defeat inclusion of consumer products that caused pollution in a regional pollu-
tion permit trading program).
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might have influence even beyond those actors specifically subject to
the particular regime. In this Article, I advance this hypothesis in the
context of environmental regulation.22
11. OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY TooLs
In this Part, I present a brief overview of prevalent environmental
regulatory tools-command-and-control regimes, information-based
regimes, tax-based regimes, and tradable pollution permit regimes.
A command-and-control regime entails the government setting a
particular standard with which polluters are obligated to comply. 23
Most extant command-and-control regulatory regimes establish per-
formance standards, but may require installation of particular tech-
nologies where monitoring to determine whether a performance
standard is being met may prove impractical or infeasible. 24 The most
common species of command-and-control regime is technology-
based-that is, a command-and-control system under which the gov-
ernment mandates installation of a particular pollution reduction
technology. It is also possible for command-and-control regimes in-
stead to rely upon government-established effluent limitations; the lat-
ter form of regime leaves polluters free to decide how to comply with
the mandated maximum effluent standards (whether by installation of
one type of technology or another, or otherwise).
An information-based regime requires polluters to divulge cer-
tain information about pollution releases.2 5 In return, polluters re-
main free to pollute; there is no mandated pollution reduction or
elimination requirement. In effect, the release of information "buys"
the polluter the right to continue to pollute. The rationale underly-
ing information-based regimes is that the release of pollution informa-
22 See infra Parts IV, V.
23 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution
Allowances and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 465, 481 (2000).
24 See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replac-
ing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289,
311 (1998).
25 For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000
& Supp. III 2003), requires manufacturers and processors of chemical substances to
maintain and file records of the chemicals they produce. Id. § 2607(a). The EPA
then compiles all the filings it receives and periodically releases a list of every chemi-
cal substance manufactured or processed in the United States. See id. § 2607(b); see
also Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11050 (2000 & Supp. 111 2003) (requiring disclosure of releases of toxic
substances and maintenance of the Toxics Release Inventory).
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tion will give rise to public pressure that will compel firms to reduce
or eliminate pollution.
The remaining environmental regulatory tools-tax-based re-
gimes and tradable pollution permit regimes-fall under the rubric of
"market-based" regulatory devices. The two tools are called "market-
based" because they each envision polluters making economic deci-
sions as to whether and how much to pollute, based upon the effective
market price of pollution. As I explain below, market-based systems
offer the possibility of achieving a desired level of pollution reduction
cost-effectively-i.e., at the lowest possible cost.
Under a tax-based regime, the government sets a tax rate for pol-
lution emissions. Each polluter must pay a tax at that rate for each
unit of pollution that the polluter emits. A tax-based regime imposes
no explicit overall limit on pollution. The system relies upon the costs
of pollution, as imposed through the pollution tax, to create an incen-
tive for pollution reduction. If societal actors act with economic ra-
tionality, then actors whose marginal cost of pollution reduction is
greater than the tax will continue to pollute and simply pay the tax;
those whose marginal cost of pollution reduction is lower than the tax
will instead opt to reduce their pollution emissions. In this way, a tax-
based system will induce the most cost-effective pollution reduction
steps, and thus tend to achieve overall pollution reduction at the low-
est possible cost.
The implementation of a standard tradable pollution permit con-
sists of three basic steps.2 6 First, the government determines an ac-
ceptable overall level of pollution for the region 27 to be regulated.
The government translates that overall level into an acceptable
amount of pollution emissions over a period of time (usually annu-
ally). It then breaks that total amount down into numerous pieces,
and assigns each piece to numerous "pollution permits" or "emissions
allowances." Second, the government allocates the permits among so-
cietal actors. Under extant programs, that is generally accomplished
by "grandfathering" the permits, that is, by allocating them at no
charge to preexisting polluters in proportion to each polluter's preex-
isting pollution record. 28 It is also possible to use an auction as a dis-
26 See Nash, supra note 23, at 483-85.
27 The use of the word "region" should not be taken to imply that tradable pollu-
tion permit regimes cannot apply to regulate pollution of media other than air. To
the contrary, tradable pollution permit regimes have been used to regulate water pol-
lution, for example. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
28 Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275,
284-89.
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tribution mechanism.2 9 Third, the government allows societal actors
to trade the permits among themselves. Although it is possible to con-
ceive of regimes under which trading might be limited in some way,3 0
most extant regimes allow for unfettered trading within the regulated
region.3'
Tradable pollution permit regimes seek to achieve pollution re-
duction at the lowest possible CoSt, 3 2 to increase incentives to develop
new pollution-reduction technologies, and to allocate pollution al-
lowances to those who value them most highly. These goals turn on
the emergence of a robust market for permits, which in turn requires
that transaction costs remain relatively low. 3 3
First, as to cost-effectiveness, trading allows a firm that can reduce
its pollution emissions relatively cheaply to do so and be rewarded
with excess pollution permits that it can sell. 34 On the other hand, a
firm with a relatively high marginal cost of pollution reduction instead
can choose to purchase permits at less cost.35 Thus, the government's
overall level of pollution reduction is achieved, but at a lower cost
than if the government mandated that each polluter reduced its pollu-
tion proportionately. 3 6
Second, a trading regime rewards participants for every marginal
reduction in pollution emissions they can achieve that costs less than
the market price of a permit.37 Because participants will be willing to
pay for technologies that reduce pollution emissions, there is an in-
29 The Clean Air Act requires that a few permits be distributed by auction each
year. Clean Air Act § 416(b), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 7651o(b), (d) (2000); see Jonathan
Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit
Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 584-86 (2001).
30 Indeed, Richard Revesz and I have recommended a system under which trad-
ing would be constrained in order to control against unacceptably large concentra-
tions of pollutants at particular locations. See infra note 145.
31 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 582-614. The Regional Clean Air Incen-
tives Market (or "RECLAIM") sulfur and nitrogen oxides emissions trading program
in the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area does divide the regulated region into
two zones-a coastal zone and an inland zone-with sales of permits allowed within
either zone, but only from the coastal zone to the inland zone and not the other way.
Id. at 611-12.
32 Tradable pollution permit regimes generally do not, although they perhaps
should, include distributional goals. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
33 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 631.
34 See Nash, supra note 23, at 485.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 486.
37 See Driesen, supra note 24, at 325.
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centive for companies to develop such technologies.38 By contrast,
most extant environmental regulatory regimes employ a command-
and-control approach that offers no reward, and therefore little incen-
tive to develop technologies, to- reduce emissions below the regulatory
standard.
Third, a trading regime in theory will allocate pollution permits
to those societal actors who value them most highly. Actors who value
pollution permits highly-presumably because those actors can use
the permits to make more of a profit from productive use of the per-
mits than can other actors-will be willing to pay a premium to obtain
permits; in contrast, actors who value the permits less will be pleased
to accept payment-presumably because they can profit more by sell-
ing the permits than by making use of them. In the end, then, the
permits should wind up in the hands of those who value them most
highly.39
Tradable pollution permits have become more common in re-
cent years.40 The most well known regime is the flagship national sul-
fur dioxide emissions program that Congress enacted under the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.41 Tradable pollution permit re-
38 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 STA. L. R~v. 1333, 1346 (1985). For a skeptical analysis of this point, see David M.
Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10,094 (2003).
39 But see Saul Levnore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 117-18 (2000)
(arguing that, where wealth is distributed inequitably, markets will "not guarantee
that goods will end up where they are most wanted"). At the same time, Levmore by
no means discounts the benefits of markets. He elucidates:
While markets are often advertised as allocating goods to the highest valuing
users, unequal wealth makes this claim contestable. The much more easily
defended claim, and one that is normally advertised, is that markets en-
courage a larger economic pie, which is likely to find its way to the hands of
many participants, wealthy and impoverished alike. In between is the plausi-
ble claim that even with wealth inequality, markets do a good job of encour-
aging a reasonable level of production of goods; utility is unlikely to be
increased in switching to a scheme in which some non-market force ordered
or contracted for production levels. Finally, even where markets enable
wealthy but relatively low-valuing users to acquire goods, these purchases do
improve the positions of both buyers and sellers.
Id. at 118-19 (footnote omitted).
40 For a general discussion of the rising role over the past thirty years of environ-
mental economics in environmental legal policy, see Wallace E. Oates, From Research to
Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 135.
41 See Clean Air Act, Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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gimes have also been used to regulate water pollution 4 2-indeed, the
Environmental Protection Agency has recently set out guidelines for
states to implement trading programs under the Clean Water Act 4 3 -
and proposals abound to extend the use of the regimes to help regu-
late other environmental problems. 44 Tradable pollution permit re-
gimes have also emerged on the international stage: the seeds for a
global trading program to curb greenhouse gas emissions appear in
the Kyoto Protocol. 45 Still, command-and-control regulation remains
a common-if not the dominant-form of domestic environmental
regulation; actual implementation of tradable pollution permit re-
gimes lags behind their academic endorsement. 46
42 See, e.g., Robert C. Anderson et al., Cost Savings from the Use of Market Incentives
for Pollution Control, in MARKET-BASED APPROACHES To ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 15,
30-31 (Richard F. Kosobud & Jennifer M. Zimmerman eds., 1997) (discussing water
pollution trading programs).
43 See Water Quality Trading Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608 (Jan. 13, 2003).
44 See, e.g., David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, Note, From Smokestacks to Species: Ex-
tending the Tradable Permit Approach from Air Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN.
ENvTL. L.J. 405 (1996) (suggesting the use of a tradable pollution permit regime for
habitat conservation to preserve endangered species). But see Lorraine McCarthy,
State Environmental Commissioner Urges Termination of Emissions Trading Program, 33
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2062 (Sept. 20, 2002) (indicating that New Jersey Will discontinue
its intrastate air pollution trading program).
45 See Nash, supra note 23, at 493-96 (citing Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 3d. Sess. U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/19971/
Add. 1 (1998)); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29
CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 111 (2001)..
46 See Robert W. Hahn et al., Environmental Regulation in the 1990s: A Retrospective
Analysis, 27 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 377, 404 (2003) ("In reality, market-based policy
instruments are used to implement only a very small fraction of environmental regula-
tion in the United States."); Merrill, supra note 28, at 277; Carol M. Rose, Romans,
Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 94 (2003) ("Currently, [tradable environmental allowances]
are in force only in very limited spheres, despite the enormous theoretical interest in
them."); Stewart, supra note 45, at 24-25 ("[T] he basic system of command regulation
established in the 1970s, in which environmental problems in different media are
addressed in different, uncoordinated statutes, persists to this day."). But cf. David M.
Driesen, Trading and Its Limits, 14 PENN ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 169, 169 (2006) (noting
that, today, EPA "rarely develops any pollution control program without including
some form of environmental trading within it"); Robert N. Stavins, What Do We Really
Know About Market-Based Approaches to Environmental Policy?: Lessons from Twenty-Five
Years of Experience, in EMISSIONS TRADING 49, 53 (Richard F. Kosobud ed., 2003)
(" [T] here has been an unmistakable shift of the political center toward [market-based
regulation].").
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II1. THE "RIGHT TO POLLUTE" AND "COMMODIFICATION" CRITIQUES
My argument that framing effects can influence environmental
regulatory choice rests upon the assertion of two critiques-the "right
to pollute" and "commodification" critiques-to certain forms of envi-
ronmental regulatory instruments but not others. In this Part, I expli-
cate the two critiques in the context of environmental regulation.
The critiques are generally applied to the market-based regulatory
tools-taxes and tradable pollution permits-with a particular empha-
sis on the latter. In subsequent parts, I demonstrate that both criti-
ques in fact have applicability in respect of all the environmental
regulatory options I discuss here, and argue that the particular appli-
cability of the critiques to market-based instruments is the result, at
least in part, of framing effects.
A. The "Right to Pollute" Critique
Many opponents assail tradable pollution permit regimes for cre-
ating a "right to pollute."47 The problem with the government crea-
47 See James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental Protection, 55
MONT. L. REv. 425, 432 (1994) ("Most environmental groups have opposed the trade-
able emissions approach, generally on the ground that no one should have a right to
pollute."); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Wat Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVis L. REV.
175, 197 (2003) ("[M]any environmentalists complain that market mechanisms are
mere 'license[s] to pollute' . . . ." (quoting STEVEN P. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCEN-
TIVAES? ECONOMISTS ANt THE ENVIRONMENT 44 (1981))); see also Matthew L. Wald, Util-
ity Is Selling Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at IA. Barry Commoner applied
the critique, in respect of the proposal for a national sulfur dioxide emission trading
program (which later came to fruition), thus:
This is . . . a perverse parody of the "free market." . .. [1]nstead of goods-
useful things that people want-being exchanged, "bads" that nobody wants
are traded. It is a market that cannot operate unless it is provided with what
it is supposed to exchange-pollutants. This is a proposal that not only fails
to prevent pollution but actually requires it.
BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 188 (1992).
Steven Kelman provides empirical evidence of the prevalence of the "right to
pollute" view among Democratic Senate staffers and environmentalists in the early
1980s. See Steven Kelman, Economic Incentives and Environmental Policy: Politics, Ideology,
and Philosophy, in INCENTWES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 291, 303-04, 304
tbl.14.3 (Thomas C. Schelling ed., 1983) (describing Democratic Senate staffers' gen-
eral adherence to the "right to pollute" critique); id. at 310-11 tbls.14.5 & 14.6; id. at
311 ("Thirty-seven percent of environmentalist respondents mentioned the 'license to
pollute' argument, and those mentioning that argument were also more likely to op-
pose charges. . . ."); id. at 311-19 (describing the staying power of the critique).
Some commentators suggest that even environmentalists have essentially aban-
doned the "right to pollute" critique. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environ-
mental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE LJ. 677, 726 (1999)
2oo6]
[VOL. 82:1
- rAME' LAW REVIEW
326 NU, .
tion of "rights to pollute," the argument proceeds, 
is that it functions
to remove the stigma that otherwise is, and generally 
should be, asso-
ciated with pollution.
Steven Kelman delineates three constituent reasons 
why environ-
mentalists might be concerned about government 
action that gives
rise to a "right to pollute."
48 First, the condemnation of pollution is
"good intrinsically (or right in itself), because it can be seen as just
that good behavior be praised and bad behavior 
condemned. ' 49 The
generation of pollution, on this account, is an 
evil, to be condemned
along with (for example) racial discrimination and murder. 
By creat-
ing "rights to pollute," the government in effect 
endorses that evil.5 0
Second, governmental stigmatization of pollution 
sends a signal
to society encouraging citizens to develop pro-environmental 
prefer-
ences.5 1 So too, then, may the absence of stigma 
send the opposite
signal: "The 'license to pollute' that an economic 
incentives policy im-
plies may influence citizen preferences in 
a direction that gives
achievement of a clean environment less weight-and 
hence lower
the level of cleanup that society finally requires."
- 2 Moreover, this ef-
fect may carry over to actors who are not subject to direct regulation
("Most environmental advocates have indeed given up 
the 'license to pollute' rhetoric
over the past fifteen years, recognizing the effectiveness 
of incentives at controlling
pollution and seeking instead the careful design 
of incentive instruments to ensure
real environmental quality improvement."). However, 
recent contributions to the
literature continue to describe environmental 
groups as advancing the critique. See,
e.g., Thompson, supra, at 197-98.
48 See KELMAN, supra note 47, at 44-53.
49 Id. at 48; see generally id. at 47-48 
(describing "a judgment that is very common"
and government's ability to "apply[ ] it ... to polluting 
behavior" through stigma-
tizing regulations).
50 See COMMONER, supra note 47, at 213; Robert 
E. Goodin, Selling Environmental
Indulgences, 47 Kyos 573, 575 (1994) (drawing an analogy 
between market-based
environmental regulation's "sales" of pollution 
rights and sales by the Catholic
Church of indulgences in the Middle Ages); see also Richard 
B. Stewart, Economic In-
centives for Environmental Protection: Opportunities and Obstacles, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
171, 198-99 (Richard L. Revesz et al.
eds., 2000) (describing and dissecting the argument); 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How
Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying 
California's Carpool
Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1285 (2000) (summarizing the 
argument, which Strahilevitz
opines is "too simplistic to be satisfying"); id. ("Pollution 
is a bad thing, and the gov-
ernment should not approve of anyone's efforts 
to produce it." (footnote omitted)).
51 See KELMAN, supra note 47, at 49-52. This 
stigma may not translate, however,
into strong pro-environmental norms that 
significantly affect behavior. See Ann E.
Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 
1295-96 (2001) (drawing on empirical
evidence to conclude that the degree to which 
recycling behavior is convenient may
encourage the behavior more than a social 
norm in favor of the behavior).
52 KELMAN, supra note 47, at 49.
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by the government; thus, it is possible that actors who are directly sub-
ject to government regulation that gives rise to a "right to pollute"
may reduce their pollution (as they are obligated to under the regula-
tion), but that society's overall attitude toward reduction of pollution
is less demanding, with the result that overall pollution in fact
increases.
53
Third, Kelman argues that governmental recognition of a "right
to pollute" would remove an incentive for polluters to reduce their
own pollution: "Stigmatization of polluting behavior will tend to in-
crease compliance with social measures to reduce pollution. Stigmati-
zation may also act to make polluters realize that their behavior shows
insufficient concern for others, thus changing their attitudes and, per-
haps, their resistance to environmental laws." 54
53 Bruno Frey argues:
The sale of licenses allowing a specific amount of pollution suggests to peo-
ple that pollution is not morally condemned and that once a license has
been granted, a 'license to pollute' has been acquired. The environmental
decision-makers . . , fear the destruction of environmentally relevant intrin-
sic motivation spilling over into those areas where pricing instruments are
not applicable .... People perceive the environment as a whole. Decision-
makers fear that the use of pricing instruments would lead to a counter-
productive effect: the quality of the environment is improved in those areas
where tradeable licenses (or environmental charges or taxes) are applied,
but environmental quality is lowered in all other areas because the guiding
environmental ethic has weakened or has been completely destroyed. This
reduced ethic moreover hampers individuals' willingness to accept any kind
of action to fight pollution, i.e., political support for environmental policies
would also be decreased.
Bruno S. Frey, Motivation as a Limit to Pricing, 14J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 635, 652 (1993).
The potential for both command-and-control restrictions and ethical motivations
to influence behavior is demonstrated by a sign in the Tulane University main parking
complex elevator, which reads: "COURTESY IS CONTAGIOUS! PLEASE PARK
WITHIN THE LINES. VIOLATORS WILL BE ISSUED CITATIONS!" See also
Charisse Jones, NYC Tackles Cellphone Etiquette: Legislating What's Rude Goes Too Far,
Some Claim, USA TODAY, Oct. 31, 2002, at 3A (discussing proposed New York City
legislation that would have imposed fines on individuals whose cellular telephones
ring during indoor performances).
54 KELMAN, supra note 47, at 52; see generally id. at 52-53 (connecting "the success
of stigmatization with the existence of a sense of social interdependence").
Compare Kelman's argument with the argument advanced in David B. Spence,
The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environ-
mental Law, 89 CAL. L. REv. 917 (2001). Spence argues that the existing environmen-
tal regulatory framework relies too heavily on a "rational polluter" presumption-that
is, the presumption that societal actors will pollute to the extent that regulation di-
rects them not to. See id. at 919-31. Spence suggests that many societal actors choose
to reduce their pollution on their own, and that in fact many polluters exceed pollu-
tion limits unintentionally-despite extensive and expensive efforts to comply-sim-
2006]
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B. The "Commodification" Critique
Opponents also frequently raise a "commodification" critique of
tradable pollution permit regimes and certain other forms of environ-
mental regulation. 55 This complaint argues that tradable pollution
permits render the environment, or environmental quality, a mere
"commodity," and that that "commodification" is wrong. Despite this
general statement of the commodification critique, the critique in fact
arises in different guises and with varying scope.
It is appropriate to begin an elucidation of commodification with
a discussion of commensurability, of which commodification is a spe-
cial case. 56 Essentially, two items are commensurable if there is a com-
ply because the pollution restrictions established by government are too arcane and
complex for strict compliance reasonably to be expected. See id. at 931-77. Based
upon this, Spence argues that environmental regulation should be modified to take
into account the average polluter's good faith efforts to reduce pollution and to com-
ply with government regulation. See id. at 993-96.
Interestingly, if those who attach import to the stigmatization of pollution emis-
sions for the development of proper social norms are correct, then Spence's argu-
ment may suffer from a circularity: Spence argues in effect that the fact that societal
actors will not generally pollute up to the limits of government regulation justifies
moving away from a strict command-and-control regulatory approach. Yet if the crit-
ics of market-based regulation are correct, then the persistence of command-and-con-
trol regulation is the very reason that societal actors conform to norms of pollution
reduction. If that is so, then while the removal of command-and-control regulation
might in the short run create greater governmental-private sector cooperation toward
pollution reduction, it would likely in the long run lead to far greater pollution as a
result of the removal of both (i) strict limits on pollution emissions and (ii) the result-
ing anti-pollution norms.
Kelman's argument may also be contrasted by an argument advanced by Timothy
Malloy. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets,
80 TEx. L. REv. 531 (2002). Malloy advances the claim that traditional analyses of
corporate compliance with environmental regulation have assumed, wrongly, that
corporate decisionmaking is monolithic. Id. at 544-49. Malloy argues to the contrary
that environmental decisionmaking within the corporate form is generally far more
complex and will depend upon exactly how the decisionmaking authority is vested
within the corporate structure. Id. at 592-600. As such, the effect of external factors,
including social norms, on corporate environmental compliance decisions may de-
pend upon which individuals and/or divisions within a corporation are actually called
upon to make those decisions. Id. at 556-65.
55 KELMAN, supra note 47, at 44 (noting that environmental incentives are seen by
opponents as granting "an unacceptable 'license to pollute'").
56 See Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. Rv. 1215,
1215 n.3 (1998) ("The debates about commodification plainly are related to the de-
bates about commensurability.... For instance, a belief in universal commodification
would presuppose the validity of commensurability. More reasonably, one could be-
lieve that all values or reasons are reducible to a common metric of utility, pleasure,
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mon metric according to which they can be ranked relative to one
another; the two items are incommensurable if that is not the case., 7
Commodification is a type of commensurability. The fact that
something has been "commodified" means that it has been rendered
property-like, and subject to market-like transactions. 5 The com-
modified thing necessarily then is commensurable with other things
like it, insofar as the things can be (effectively or literally) bought and
sold for money; thus, dollar value provides the common metric that
commensurability requires. In effect, the commodified thing is ren-
dered, like the money for which it can be traded, fungible. 59
But commodification goes beyond commensurability: Property-
like features and market-like transactions are not required for com-
mensurability, but are critical to commodification. Margaret Radin
elucidates the concept of commodification, suggesting two construc-
tions of the term "commodification," one narrow and the other
broad. The narrow conception of commodification "describes actual
buying and selling (or legally permitted buying and selling) of some-
thing."60 The broad conception includes "not only actual buying and
selling, but also market rhetoric, the practice of thinking about inter-
actions as if they were sale transactions, and market methodology, the
use of monetary cost-benefit analysis to judge these interactions." 61
self-expression, virtue, or something else, but are not reducible to a common metric
of a medium of exchange." (citations omitted)).
57 See MARGARETJANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 118 (1996) ("By commen-
surability, I mean that values of things can be arrayed as a function of one continuous
variable, or can be linearly ranked."); Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: In-
troduction, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1169, 1170 (1998) ("Roughly speaking, 'incommensura-
bility' means the absence of a scale or metric."); Cass R. Sunstein, Incomrmensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 796 (1994) ("Incommensurability occurs
when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing vio-
lence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized."
(emphasis omitted)). The term's precise definition is open to some debate. See, e.g.,
Adler, supra, at 1170 (discussing three related, but distinct, definitions of incommen-
surability of options); Sunstein, supra, at 795-99 (describing the contours of the
term); cf. id. at 798 (distinguishing commensurability from compatibility). The con-
cept of "incommensurability" has been the subject of considerable academic atten-
tion. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra; Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 1169 (1998).
58 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1855
(1987) (defining "commodified" as something "deemed suitable for trade in a laissez-
faire market").
59 See infra note 63 (discussing the link between commodification and
fungibility).
60 Radin, supra note 58, at 1859.
61 Id.
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Radin then defines "universal commodification" 
as the broad concep-
tion of commodification "in its most expansive 
form."6 2 Universal
commodification "limit[s] actual buying and selling 
only by the dic-
tates of market methodology, and solving 
problems of contested corn-
modification by making everything 
in principle a commodity."63
With the general contours of commodification 
in place, I turn to
two questions that arise in the particular 
context of commodification
of the environment. First, why is commodification 
of the environ-
ment thought to be a bad thing?
64 Second, what exactly constitutes
commodification of the environment?
62 Id.
63 Id. Under universal commodification, "anything 
some people are willing to
sell and others are willing to buy in principle 
can and should be the subject of free
market exchange," and "everything people need 
or desire, either individually or in
groups, is conceived of as a commodity." Id. 
at 1860.
In her book, Contested Commodities, Radin offers 
a more formal description of
commodification, one that links commodification 
with the concepts of fungibility and
commensurability:
[L]iteral complete commodification is characterized 
by (1) exchanges of
things in the world (2) for money, (3) in the social context 
of markets, and
(4) in conjunction with four indicia of commodification in 
conceptualiza-
tion. Those four conceptual indicia characterize 
complete commodification
in rhetoric. They are (i) objectification, (ii) fungibility,
(iii) commensurability, and (iv) money equivalence. 
Literal commodifica-
tion and commodification in conceptualization 
need not be coextensive in
practice, but they are loosely interdependent. 
Unless the market conceptual
scheme (market rhetoric) were prevalent in the world, 
literal market ex-
changes could not have the meaning they do. 
And unless literal market ex-
changes were prevalent in [the] world, we would 
not be able to operate
inside the conceptual scheme the way we do.
RADIN, supra note 57, at 118. Radin further expounds:
The indicia of commodification in conceptualization 
are related to one an-
other, but each of them plays a slightly different 
role in our understanding
of commodification. Objectification relates to ontological 
commitment. By
objectification, I mean ascription of status as a thing in the 
Kantian sense of
something that is manipulable at the will of persons. 
Fungibility relates to
exchange. By fungibility, I mean at least 
that the things are fully inter-
changeable with no effect on value to the holder. 
Fungibility may also mean
that the things can be equated with a sum of 
money. If fungibility has this
meaning, it collapses into commensurability. 
Commensurability relates to
the nature of value. By commensurability, I 
mean that values of things can
be arrayed as a function of one continuous 
variable, or can be linearly
ranked. By money equivalence, I mean that the 
continuous variable in terms
of which things can be ranked is dollar value.
Id.
64 That is not to say that it is the commodification 
only of the environment that is
the subject of criticism. For a recent extension of commodification 
(through cost-
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Kelman offers the most thorough treatment of the problems that
supposedly arise from commodification of the environment. Kelman
identifies two "psychological costs of using the market" to regulate en-
vironmental protection: the "feeling-falloff effect"65  and the
"downvaluation effect." 66 With respect to the feeling-falloff effect, Kel-
man first argues that the necessarily impersonal nature of market
transactions will tend to decrease the value of human interactions.
This will have the effect, he continues, of decreasing feeling-inducing
behaviors-such as altruism and spontaneity67-and increasing feel-
ings of loneliness and distrust.68
Kelman identifies three essential reasons for the downvaluation
effect of markets. First, the feeling-falloff effect itself results in a loss
of value. 69 Second, goods that are not subjected to market transac-
tions because of a perception that they should be shared equally lose
that status when markets are introduced.7 0 Third, Kelman notes that
benefit analysis) that some-but not all, see infra note 66-criticize, see Edmund L.
Andrews, New Scale for Toting Up Lost Freedom vs. Security Would Measure in Dollars, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at AI3 ("In an unusual twist on cost-benefit analysis, an eco-
nomic tool that conservatives have often used to attack environmental regulation, top
advisers to President Bush want to weigh the benefits of tighter domestic security
against the 'costs' of lost privacy and freedom.").
65 See KELMAN, supra note 47, at 57-69.
66 See id. at 69-77. Sometimes, however, commodification actually might make
people realize how valuable something really is-either because the market value is
higher than what people might have anticipated, or because of the realization that
the market value does not in fact capture the item's true worth. Thus, for example,
consumer advocate and former Green Party presidential candidate Ralph Nader sup-
ports a proposal to monetize the benefit of certain freedoms in order to determine
whether the new antiterrorism security measures that would necessitate the loss of
those freedoms are justified:
"As long as they're going to deal with monetary evaluations, I told them they
should start asking about the cost of destroying democracy," said Mr. Nader,
who lobbied Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., the [White House] budget office direc-
tor, on the issue. "If the value assigned to civil rights and privacy is zero, the
natural thing to do is just wipe them out."
Andrews, supra note 64.
67 See KFLMAN, supra note 47, at 62-69; cf. William E. Nelson, Two Models of Wel-
fare: Private Charity Versus Public Duty, 7 S. CAL. INTERDisc. L.J. 295, 315 (1998) (sug-
gesting that the shift over the last century to a centralized, government-dominated
approach for dealing with the poor in the United States has resulted in a decrease in
charitable giving but allowing more time to pursue careers and expanding businesses
by propounding the understanding that it is now the government's responsibility to
care for the poor).
68 See KELMAN, supra note 47, at 60-62.
69 See id. at 70-71.
70 See id. at 71.
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"one is able to proclaim the special value of something simply by keep-
ing it outside the system of markets and prices of which most valued
things form a part;"71 to subject such goods to market transactions
would cause an inherent downvaluation. 72
With an understanding of why critics see commodification of the
environment as problematic, I turn to the question of what exactly
constitutes commodification of the environment. To some, com-
modification of the environment entails simply engaging in activities
that require one to assign values to the environment. As her elucida-
tion of the broad conception of commodification reflects, Radin un-
derstands cost-benefit analysis to fall within the purview of
commodification, broadly construed .73  Indeed, since "[m]arket
methodology includes a cost-benefit analysis," 74 "a healthful environ-
ment" can constitute a commodity under Radin's conception of "uni-
versal commodification.."75 Elizabeth Anderson similarly sees cost-
benefit analyses undertaken in respect of environmental protection as
an example of commodification of the environment.7 6 Steven Kel-
man sees the introduction of a tax-based environmental regulatory re-
gime as commodification of the environment. 77 And Radin notes
Kelman's criticism of tax-based environmental regulation 78 in the con-
text of equating "commodification" with the "[m]onetization . . . of
clean air and water."7 9 Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling also en-
dorse this view, characterizing cost-benefit analysis as "involv[ing] the
creation of artificial markets for things-like good health, long life,
and clean air-that are not bought and sold."80 Thus, the broadest
71 Id.
72 See id. at 71-77; cf RADIN, supra note 57, at 120 ('The idea of fungibility, even
without commensurability, still undermines the notion of individual uniqueness.");
Holly Doremus, The Special Importance of Ordinary Places, 23 ENVIRONS ENVT-L. L. &
PoL'V J. 3 (2000) (arguing that the only way to safeguard nature is to protect and
preserve ordinary places and things).
73 See supra text accompanying note 61.
74 Radin, supra note 58, at 1861.
75 Id. at 1860.
76 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMics 203-10 (1993); see
also Katharine K. Baker, Consorting with Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to Natural
Resources and How We Should Value Their Loss, 22 ECOLOcY L.Q. 677, 679 n.10 (1995)
(using the term "commodification" to refer to the "process of characterizing and plac-
ing a dollar figure upon a good or value that is not generally marketable").
77 See KELMAN, supra note 47, at 54-83.
78 Radin, supra note 58, at 1857 n.36.
79 Id. at 1857.
80 Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1553, 1562 (2002). But see Lewis A. Korn-
hauser, OnJustifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29J. LECAL STui). 1037, 1048 (2000) ("[T]he
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commodification critique alleges that it is simply wrong 
to engage in a
system that effectively places a monetary value on 
the environment.
But the commodification critique also can be focused 
more nar-
rowly, and more directly, where an actual market exists. 
Radin's ap-
proach acknowledges that the commodification 
argument reaches its
zenith where "actual buying and selling" occurs.
81 Kelman takes the
same position.8 2 Thus, while taxes and tradable 
permits both may be
considered "market-based" forms of environmental 
regulation, trad-
able permits accentuate the problems of commodification 
since only
they require the existence and use of a true 
"market." Only under a
tradable pollution permit regime is the "'[right]' to 
emit a unit of
pollution . . . subject to resale."
8 3 Only a tradable pollution permit
regime creates an actual commodity, an alienable 
property interest, in
environmental quality.
84
commodification critique rests on a mistaken 
interpretation of the formal theory:
cost-benefit analysis does not price life, the 
environment, or any other irreplaceable
commodity. Rather, cost-benefit analysis places 
a value on specific policies offered in
specific contexts.").
81 See Radin, supra note 58, at 1859.
82 Kelman explains:
Setting a charge means using prices to steer 
production and allocation, but
when charges are used there is (in contrast to a marketable 
rights system
where "rights" to emit a unit of pollution would 
actually be auctioned off
and subject to resale) no direct market exchange of a thing 
called environ-
mental quality. Instead, the charge ideally would 
be set by determining the
price that would have resulted had there been 
market exchange.
The full-blown psychological costs of using 
the market occur in in-
stances where prices are established and where 
market exchange (with the
attendant decrease in production of positively 
valued feelings) occurs as
well. These would be relevant in discussions of 
proposals by economists for
greater reliance on the market in areas such 
as health care or education.
They are not, at least conceptually, fully relevant 
to proposals for using
charges in environmental policy (although they would 
be for marketable
rights proposals).
KELMAN, supra note 47, at 83; see also GRxGORY S. ALEXANDER, 
COMMODITY AND PROPRI-
ETY 183 (1997) ("Commodities are associated with freedom, 
but they are also associ-
ated .. , with alienation [of feelings and interpersonal 
relations]."). But see Norman
W. Spaulding III, Note, Commodification and Its Discontents: 
Environmentalism and the
Promise of Market Incentives, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 297-98 
(1997) (noting that there
is "complete commodification" only where the 
market sets both the ends and the
means, and that current market-based approaches 
fall short of this in that they enlist
the market only to set the means, not the ends 
(which are set politically)).
83 KELMiAN, supra note 47, at 83.
84 See Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets and 
Valuation, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 657, 691 n.
9 4
(1995) ("There are some things which do not 
have the capacity to consent to the
process of commodification and yet which 
may be degraded by that very process.
There may exist strong feelings, for example, 
that the creation of markets in pollution
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Thus, the commodification critique applies generally to market-
based forms of regulation-that is, taxes and tradable pollution per-
mits-because those types of regulation rest inherently on some no-
tion of a market for environmental quality. The implicit presumption
is that other environmental regulatory instruments do not rest on any
notion of market, and so are not subject to the commodification cri-
tique. Moreover, proponents of the commodification critique ac-
knowledge that tradable pollution permit regimes are more subject to
the critique than tax-based (and, a fortiori, other) regimes. The as-
sumption here is that tradable pollution permit regimes, alone among
environmental regulatory regimes, give rise to alienable property-
based rights in the environment.
IV. ECONOMIC REALITY AND THE CRITIQUES
In this Part, I subject both the "right to pollute" and "commodifi-
cation" critiques to the light of economic reality.
A. The Economic Reality of the "Right to Pollute" Critique
In this subpart, I explain that, notwithstanding certain common
understandings to the contrary, all environmental regulatory ap-
proaches short of complete pollution bans give rise to some form of
"right to pollute." Moreover, all these rights to pollute are, in one way
or another, alienable. Thus, the tendency to focus the "right to pol-
lute" critique against market-based regulatory instruments, and trad-
able pollution permit regimes in particular, is not grounded in
economic reality.
I begin my analysis by considering tradable pollution permits,
since these are most widely, and most clearly, seen to give rise to
"rights to pollute." Indeed, the tradable pollution permits themselves
seem to embody "rights to pollute" as a property-based entitlement.
It is widely accepted that tradable pollution permits are a form of
property.85 The common wisdom is that they are property specifically
rights encourages environmental degradation by making polluting activities perrnissi-
ble at a price. One can hardly defend such activities by developing an argument
based on consent, for the environment does not have the capacity to consent." (cita-
tion omitted)); see also Oates, supra note 40, at 142 (describing Oates' initial response
to J.H. Dales' proposal to implement a tradable pollution permit regime as "skep-
tic[al]" because of the perception that Dales was "advocating that we effectively put
the environment up for sale"; Oates notes that his perception "was proved wrong").
85 Here, I mean "property" in the traditional sense, not "constitutional property"
subject to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Cf Thomas W. Merrill, The Land-
scape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 942-94 (2000) (discussing the rela-
tionship between traditional notions of property and "constitutional property").
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because they are tradable.8 6 While it is true that alienability is a cor-
nerstone element of property, it turns out that, from a property law
perspective, tradability does not distinguish tradable permits from
other regulatory tools. In fact, many other regulatory tools-includ-
ing command-and-control regulation, information disclosure regula-
tion, and tax-based regulation-also give rise to property rights.
Tradability separates tradable permits from other regulatory forms
only in that tradability renders tradable permits stand-alone property
rights.
Most observers think of a tradable pollution permit as giving rise
to some form of property right.8 7 One who owns a permit enjoys
86 See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson &J. Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the
Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?, 10 DuKE ENWTL. L. & POL'v F. 73, 90-91
(1999) (noting that the Los Angeles metropolitan area trading program for smog
precursor emission permits "created ... property rights"); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon
L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA 's Emissions Trading Program,
6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 143 (1989) ("[R]egulators have defined a set of property rights
and placed minimum restrictions on their use" in structuring tradable emission per-
mit regimes.); Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENXvTL.
LJ. 300, 308 (1995) ("j.H.] Dales suggested the government create pollution permits
that reflect, in total, a pollution limit set by the government, and then allow firms to
trade the permits as if they were property." (footnote omitted));James E. Krier, Mar-
ketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. ToL. L. Rev. 449, 449-50 (1994) ("[Sulfur dioxide
emission permits] have some essential property-rights characteristics. Chiefly, they
confer entitlements to pollute, and these entitlements are transferable-they may be
bought and sold on the market."); Clare Langley-Hawthorne, An International Market
for Transferable Gas Emission Permits to Promote Climate Change, 9 FORDHAM ENVrL. L.
REv. 261, 298 (1998) ("The theory of tradable emission permits creates a market for
emission as externalities, and grants a quasi property right to the commons by grant-
ing what is, in effect, a license to pollute." (footnote omitted)); Franz Xaver Perrez,
The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 515, 555 (1998) ("iTlhe creation of tradable pollution rights as proposed in
the academic literature or adopted under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 for
sulfur dioxide emission, is an attempt to create individual property rights." (footnotes
omitted)).
87 Borrowing from Richard Stewart and James Krier, Carol Rose describes trad-
able pollution permit regimes as creating "hybrid property." See Carol M. Rose, The
Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83
MINN. L. REv. 129, 163-64 (1998) (citing Richard B. Stewart, Privprop, Regprop, and
Beyond, 13 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'x 91, 93 (1990), and Krier, supra note 86, at 449
(footnote omitted)). To similar effect, see also DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND
PROPERTY 45 (2002); David M. Driesen, What's Property Got to Do with It?, 30 ECOLOGY
L.Q 1003, 1007-10 (2003); Stewart, supra, at 93-94.
The rights to which tradable pollution permit regimes give rise may, or may not,
be subject to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. See supra note 85. But that is
true as well of "rights" under other environmental regulatory regimes.
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many of the standard incidents of property ownership
ss : The owner
has the right to possess exclusively the permit, to 
use the permit, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the permit, and to pledge 
the permit to
creditors.89 Even the Congressthat created 
sulfur dioxide emission
allowances and statutorily purported to disclaim 
their property sta-
tus90 nonetheless characterized the permits as 
"quasi-property."9
Although the general view is that, in contrast 
to tradable pollu-
tion permit regimes, command-and-control 
regimes do not create
property, the reality is that they also give rise 
to a property-based enti-
tlement to pollute. The general misconception 
that they do not
seems to arise from the view that tradable 
pollution permit regimes
do, while command-and-control regimes do 
not, allow for alienability
of pollution rights. While only permit systems 
feature independent
alienability, both permit systems and command-and-control 
systems
give rise to property-based rights. Although 
it is true that alienability
is a basic touchstone of whether a distinct property 
right exists 9 2 the
88 See A. M. Honorfi, Ownership, in OxFopD 
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-28
(A.G. Guest ed., Clarendon Press 1968) (1961).
89 See Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four 
Propositions About Property Rights and
Environmental Protection, 10 DuE ENvrL. L. 
& POL'Y F. 103, 113-14 (1999) (noting
that, even though the statute that creates sulfur 
dioxide emission allowances under
the national sulfur dioxide emission trading 
program includes a statement that the
allowances are not property, the statute nonetheless 
"expressly recognizes property
rights in emission allowances" (footnote omitted)); Krier, 
supra note 86, at 449-50.
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f) (2000) (providing that a sulfur 
dioxide emission al-
lowance constitutes only a "limited authorization 
to emit sulfur dioxide" and does
"not constitute a property right").
91 Henry E. Mazurek, Jr., The Future of Clean Air: The Application 
of Futures Markets
to Title IV of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 13 TEMP. 
ENvrL. L. & TECH. J. 1,
11 (1994) ("[A] House Energy and Commerce Committee 
report issued during final
debate over the [Clean Air] Amendments stated that 
allowances are like 'quasi-prop-
erty,' and therefore can be reported as 'utility 
assets.'" (quoting H.R. REP. No.
101-490, pt. 1, at 366 (1990))). "Congress further emphasized 
the durable nature of
an 'allowance' when Congressman Mike Oxley 
of Ohio interpreted the statute as
granting 'only Congress and the President, 
acting together through legislation ... 
the
authority to limit or (to] revoke allowances.'" id. at 
11 (quoting 136 CONc.. REc.
E360, E3672 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Oxley)); see also id. at 19-29
(discussing the development of the sulfur dioxide emission 
allowance futures mar-
ket); Adam J. Rosenberg, Note, Emissions Credit Futures 
Contracts on the Chicago Board of
Trade: Regional and Rational Challenges to the Right 
to Pollute, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 501,
518-19 (1994) (same).
92 See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: 
Living Within Nature's
Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927, 929-30 (2000) (noting 
that the "[b]asic characteris-
tics of property include . . . free transferability, 
or the right to alienate property"
(citing 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.1-.4 (A.James 
Casner ed., 1952))). But see
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (establishing 
that Fifth Amendment prop-
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fact that command-and-control regimes do not allow for the alienabil-
ity of any new property interest simply means that such regimes do not
create new property interests that are separable from preexisting
property interests; it does not mean that these regimes do not convey
a valuable property right.
To see this, consider a traditional command-and-control regime,
under which firms receive permits to emit a pollutant over a given
period of time provided that certain conditions (such as a cap on the
total amount emitted, or the installation of a particular pollution re-
duction technology) are met. The permits are not tradable. Each
permit inheres in the factory in respect of which it was issued; that is,
if the stock of the company that owns a factory to which a permit has
been issued is sold, the purchaser acquires the right to exploit the
permit. In this case, the permit clearly is a valuable asset to the factory
owner. Indeed, the permit has a value that presumably is amortized in
the overall value of the factory. In other words, a prospective pur-
chaser of the stock of the factory's owner would pay some additional
amount if the factory has an existing permit above what it would pay if
the purchaser would have to expend funds to obtain a new permit."
Thus, the permit constitutes a right that broadens the bundle of prop-
erty rights that ownership of the factory represents, and it is a right
that enhances the value of that property bundle.94 Viewed from the
perspective of property rights, command-and-control regimes appear
as pollution permit regimes under which the permits are not tradable
erty rights not removed by a prohibition of commercial transactions in parts of bird
legally killed before laws prohibited killing); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Concep-
tion of Property: Cross Currents in the furisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUNM. L. REV. 1667,
1673-74 (1988) (noting that the Supreme Court's Takings jurisprudence has af-
forded low constitutional protection to the right of alienability).
93 See Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollu-
tion Permits: Problems of Regulatoy Interactions, I YALE J. ON REG. 63, 70 (1983)
("[Gliving a firm a permit to operate a polluting facility if it is in compliance with
regulatory standards conveys a limited property right."). Allowing the permits to be
tradable enhances the value of the permits. See id.; see also id. at 72 ("[Riegulation of
SOx emissions in Los Angeles [through, at the time, non-tradable pollution permits]
has created a new property right-a permit to emit-that is half as valuable as the
compliance costs that have been undertaken to meet existing standards and roughly
ten times as valuable as the short-run efficiency gains to be derived from making per-
mits freely tradable.").
94 Along similar lines, to the extent that the tax code authorizes a corporation
that purchases another corporation to benefit from the purchased corporation's un-
used net operating losses, see generally I.R.C. § 382 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006) (estab-
lishing limits on certain losses following ownership change), one would expect the
sellers of the purchased corporation to have fetched a better price than they would
have if the corporation had no usable net operating losses.
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separate from the underlying property.
95 In the end, moreover,
whether the government in fact issues actual "permits" 
or not is of no
moment; the property nature of the right conferred 
remains.
Thus, command-and-control regimes give rise to 
property-based
"rights to pollute." An effluent-based standard authorizes pollution
up to the applicable effluent limitation. A technology-based 
standard
authorizes pollution once the polluter has installed 
the requisite pol-
lution reduction technology. A cap on total 
pollution allows pollution
up to that cap.
Along similar lines, an information disclosure 
regulatory regime
also gives rise to a property-based interest. Once 
the information is
disclosed, the firm has the right to pollute. 
Moreover, to the extent
that that right is a valuable one (and exceeds any costs 
associated with
the disclosure), the value of the firm will have increased, 
reflecting
the addition of that valuable right. As above, 
one can conceive of the
firm as having obtained permits to pollute from 
the government (with
the question of whether or not the firm in fact 
receives actual permits
remaining irrelevant).
Although they may not always be seen to do so, 
tax regimes also
create property-based rights to pollute. Specifically, 
they confer upon
polluters the right to emit pollution 
for each quantum of tax paid.
96
In effect, then, these regimes set up markets
97 in (nontransferable)
95 This is in conformance with the notion 
I have advanced elsewhere, that to
every tradable pollution permit regime there 
corresponds an "underlying command-
and-control regime." See Nash, supra note 23, 
at 519. In structuring a typical tradable
pollution permit regime, the government establishes 
an acceptable ambient level of
pollution, translates that level into an acceptable 
annual amount of emissions, divides
that annual amount into a number of emission 
permits, and distributes those permits
among polluters and other societal actors. Id. 
at 483-84. The government then al-
lows free trading of those permits. Id. at 484-85. 
The underlying command-and-
control regime corresponding to that tradable 
pollution permit regime comes about
when the government undertakes all the aforementioned 
steps except that it does not
allow trading of permits apart from the underlying 
property. See id. at 486.
96 Cf PAUL B. DOWNING, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 
AND POLICY 194 (1984)
("The effluent fee system implies that property rights 
are owned by recipients [of
pollution damage]. . . ."). This statement simply recognizes 
the fact that, before any
taxes are paid, property rights to pollute reside 
with the government, acting as proxy
for those who would be harmed by pollution 
emissions. Once taxes are paid, of
course, the property rights are transferred 
to the payors.
97 Traditional tax regimes generally apply 
a uniform tax rate, and thus set up
"markets" that offer the commodity at a fixed price. But this need not 
be the case-it
is possible, in theory, to take into account changes 
in marginal pollution reduction
cost by varying the tax rate over time, although this 
may prove difficult in practice. See
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority 
of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regula-
tion, 4 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 1, 6 (2002); Oates, supra 
note 40, at 139-40; cf.
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pollution emission rights; this is no different in effect 
from purchas-
ing additional units of a product on a spot market. 
It is true that these
pollution rights are not alienable separate from 
the underlying prop-
erty, but they need not be, since any polluter always 
can opt to pay
more in tax and thus to purchase additional pollution 
rights -gs
In summary, then, while only tradable pollution 
permit regimes
give rise to individuated property-based rights, 
it remains the case that
tradable pollution permits, command-and-control 
regulation, infor-
mation-based regulation, and tax-based regimes 
all give rise to prop-
erty-based rights to pollute. Indeed, it seems 
that, insofar as all these
regulatory approaches allow polluters to engage 
in some amount of
pollution, all these systems give rise to property-based 
rights to pol-
lute.99 More generally, all environmental regulatory 
regimes, short of
absolute bans on pollution, give rise to property-based 
"rights to
pollute." 100
Indeed, the realization that only a total ban 
on pollution confers
no "right to pollute" truly undermines the critique 
insofar as, in real-
ity, a total ban on pollution is both impractical 
and undesirable. 0 1
While pollution standing alone may be undesirable 
and might even be
considered an "evil," the fact remains that many 
socially beneficial ac-
Strahilevitz, supra note 50, at 1251 (describing a system under 
which drivers may pay a
toll to gain access to San Diego freeway express 
lanes, with the toll varying according
to how much traffic is currently making use 
of the express lanes, explaining "[tlhe
more traffic is in the Express Lanes, the higher 
the toll will be").
98 Cf Frank Snare, The Concept of Property, 9 AM. PHIL. Q. 
200, 201 (1972) ("Some
rules, although they regulate property, presuppose 
its existence. Laws which tax
property would be such as these." (footnote omitted)).
99 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 89, at 105-09 (arguing that 
"all solutions to environ-
mental problems are 'property-based"'); Carol M. Rose, 
Rethinking Environmental Con-
trols: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DuKE L.J. 
1, 23 ("Many of us who
teach property law think that all these control 
strategies [for regulating the environ-
ment] represent different kinds of property regimes, but 
conventional usage only
calls the individualized right a property right.").
That is not to say that the value of the property 
rights conferred by the various
systems is identical. Indeed, it is likely that the 
values would be different. For exam-
ple, an independently alienable right is likely more 
valuable than a right that can only
be transferred in conjunction with the underlying asset.
100 Nash, supra note 23, at 529; Wiener, supra 
note 47, at 724 ("[AIIU policies,
except an absolute ban, amount to licensing 
some 'right to pollute."').
101 That is not to say that a ban on a particular 
pollutant is necessarily either imprac-
tical or undesirable. For example, the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. 
No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, was
designed to effect the elimination of emissions 
of certain ozone-depleting chemicals
by parties to the treaty. Still, a total ban on all forms 
of pollution remains impractical
and undesirable.
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tivities generate pollution as a necessary byproduct.'0 2 Society has de-
cided-if implicitly-to balance the benefits of the socially productive
activities that result in pollution generation with the costs of the pollu-
tion itself. There is, then, some optimal level of pollution-that is, a
level of pollution that maximizes the excess of those benefits above
the costs-and that optimal level of pollution is greater than zero. 10°
On this basis, Eric Posner identifies not a strict anti-pollution norm,
but rather a norm "not to pollute 'too much.' "1 04 The absolute ban
on pollution that a strict anti-pollution norm would mandate is
neither realistic nor desirable.' 0 5
Once one accepts the undesirability of an absolute pollution ban,
one's focus shifts to the regulatory system's method and extent of allo-
cating pollution rights. From that perspective, tax-based regimes and
tradable pollution permit regimes that rely upon auctions for the ini-
tial allocation of permits fare better than other regimes: Those re-
gimes at least charge something for every property right obtained. In
contrast, grandfathering-based tradable permit regimes, command-
and-control regimes, and information-based regimes distribute at least
some property rights free of charge. t °6
102 See Stewart, supra note 50, at 199 ("The laws of physics make (pollution]
residuals an inevitable consequence of human activity. Zero residuals discharge is an
unattainable and undesirable objective.").
103 See Nash, supra note 23, at 523 n.222. Still, there is likely to be great disagree-
ment as to where that optimal level lies, and the question remains as to whether the
government accurately might identify the optimal level. See id. at 525 n.224.
104 Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697,
1735 (1996). Posner elucidates: "Firms are entitled to pollute a bit, especially when
they employ a lot of people and produce valuable goods. But if firms exceed a certain
threshold of pollution, neighbors complain, consumers boycott, and so on." Id.
105 See Strahilevitz, supra note 50, at 1285 ("Nor is it accurate to suggest that in the
absence of a trading system, social norms will necessarily dictate that every pollutant
be banned, Obviously, the public is willing to tolerate some level of pollution and is
unwilling to tolerate a higher level."). It is thus not surprising that pollution control
legislation is not designed to achieve the actual elimination of pollution. See, e.g.,J.B.
Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act
"HCP" Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVrL. LAw. 345, 349 (1999) ("[T] he
[Clean Water Act) does not leave it that 'the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful,' but rather that such activities are unlawful 'l[except as in compli-
ance with' the terms of the statute." (quoting Clean Water Act, § 301(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311 (a) (1994))). At the same time, even if the eradication of pollution is not itself
viable, it can be identified-and indeed is identified in various pollution control stat-
utes-as a societal aspiration. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (a) (1) (2000) ("[1]t is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985 .... ).
106 See Nash, supra note 23, at 509 (" [Slome form of free distribution of pollution
allowances is imbedded (even if not explicitly) in command-and-control regimes.");
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Kelman acknowledges this response, but maintains 
that standard-
based regulation imposes a stigma on pollution that 
market-based reg-
ulation does not.'0 7 The tradable permit removes 
any normative ele-
ment; the legal rule is, in Saul Levmore's terms, 
"a mere price" with
no sanction. 10 8 Kelman argues that standard-based 
regulation calls on
polluters to do "'the best they can' to reduce pollution."
10 9 Kelman's
argument on this point is not sustained, and its 
basis is murky. After
all, if both command-and-control and market-based 
regulation allow
certain levels of pollution, why is it objectively correct to say that 
com-
mand-and-control regulation, but not market-based 
regulation, calls
upon polluters to do the best they can to reduce pollution? 
Indeed,
insofar as tax systems and auction-based trading 
schemes charge for
each unit of pollution, is it not more accurate to 
say that those systems
call upon polluters to do the best they can to reduce 
pollution? While
Kelman may be correct that command-and-control 
regulations are un-
derstood to impose a greater stigma on pollution 
and therefore to call
upon polluters to do the best they can to reduce 
pollution, that nor-
mative perception is incorrect. I argue below that 
this inaccurate per-
Wiener, supra note 47, at 724 ("[Clonduct-based technology 
requirements and fixed
performance standards amount to a license 
to pollute for free once the requisite tech-
nology is installed or the quantity target is achieved. 
Taxes and tradeable allowances,
by contrast, force the polluter to pay for 
every unit of emissions, either by paying the
tax or by forfeiting the revenue from the sale 
of the allowance. Thus, it is conduct
rules and fixed quantity rules, ironically, that 
truly license a right to pollute for
free."); cf Stewart, supra note 50, at 198 (,,CIommand-and-control 
regulation does
not stigmatize or send any negative signal with respect 
to the residuals that are permit-
ted by command standards. By contrast, [market-based 
regimes] impose an eco-
nomic cost on all residuals, reminding sources 
that any level of residuals may impose
social costs. This message is most evident in the 
case of environmental taxes."). Note
that a command-and-control system may impose 
only fixed costs on polluters, so that
the per emission cost varies according to how 
much pollution each polluter in fact
emits.
107 See KELMAN, supra note 47, at 53.
108 Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 
VA. L. REv. 1989, 1998 (2000). Refer-
ring explicitly to "courts," though acknowledging 
that the point extends to adminis-
trative agencies and legislatures as well, id. at 
1999 n.12, Levmore explains:
Laws are more than prices when courts had expected 
behavioral changes
and are annoyed to find no such changes. Laws 
are less than prices when
courts observe through repeat litigation that there 
have been no behavioral
adjustments, and then reassess their original findings in a 
way that now
yields to [the lawbreaker].
Id. at 1999. See generally id. at 1998-99 (explaining that 
tort liability for pollution is
frequently nothing more than a price for pollution 
because tort suits for pollution
usually result in monetary judgments against defendants and 
nothing more).
109 KELN4AN, supra note 47, at 53.
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ception results from framing.' 10 Further, an inaccurate normative
perception is something that perhaps can, and, if so should, be
changed, perhaps by public education, a point to which I return
below. I II
A final ground on which one might hold out for the propriety of
singling out tradable pollution permit regimes under the "right to pol-
lute" critique is the argument that the "rights to pollute" to which a
tradable permit regime gives rise are especially property-like, and
therefore objectionable, because they are alienable. This argument,
too, proves ultimately unconvincing.
While the common wisdom is that only tradable pollution permit
regimes give rise to rights that are alienable, it is in fact not the case
that tradable pollution permit regimes are the only regimes that give
rise to alienable property rights. To the contrary, the property-based
rights to which other environmental regulatory regimes give rise gen-
erally also are alienable: They may be transferred along with the un-
derlying property with which they are associated. Thus, for example,
where a command-and-control regime vests a valuable property right
with a factory, the owner of the factory may sell that right, along with
the factory, to a willing buyer." 12 Note, moreover, that, because the
property right conferred by the command-and-control regime is valua-
ble, the seller will receive more for its factory than it would without
that right. Thus, the factory owner is free to transfer the property
110 See infra Part V.
111 See infra Part VI.
112 Some systems make alienation upon transfer of assets easier than others. See,
e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.61(b) (2005) (providing for "[a]utomatic transfers" of National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System permits under the Clean Water Act to new
owners or operators). At the same time, even the Clean Water Act regulation does
empower the Administrator of the EPA to "notify the existing permittee and the pro-
posed new permittee of his or her intent to modify or revoke and reissue the permit."
Id. § 122.61 (b) (3); see id. § 122.41(l)(3) ("This permit is not transferable to any per-
son except after notice to the Director. The Director may require modification or
revocation and reissuance of the permit to change the name of the permittee and
incorporate such other requirements as may be necessary under the Clean Water
Act."); id, § 122.41 (g) ("This permit does not convey any property rights of any sort,
or any exclusive privilege."); Esther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking
Beyond Potential Cost Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 43, 98 n.149 (1993) ("In general, NPDES
permits are not readily transferable.").
For a general discussion of transferability of environmental permits, see Maureen
A. Brennan & Christopher W. Armstrong, Transfer of Environmental Permits in Real Es-
tate Transactions, 716 PLI/CoRP. 87 (1990). The authors note that some permits may
be more difficult to transfer than others, highlighting that state-issued permits may be
subject to greater restraints on transferability.
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right, for value; the only restriction is that the property 
right cannot
be alienated separately from the underlying 
property 113
Thus, all environmental regulatory regimes (short of absolute
pollution bans) give rise to rights to pollute. These rights 
to pollute,
moreover, are generally alienable, in one way 
or another.
B. The Economic Reality of the "Commodification" Critique
In this subpart, I explore the susceptibility of the 
various environ-
mental regulatory tools to the "commodification" 
critique, in an effort
to determine the proper extent to which market-based 
instruments-
including, particularly, tradable pollution permit 
systems-should be
the focus of the critique. First, I address the argument 
that tradable
pollution permit regimes are properly subject to the critique 
specifi-
cally because they give rise to alienable property-based 
rights. I argue
that, as I have established above, tradable pollution 
permit regimes
are not unique in that regard.
Second, I address the argument that tradable 
pollution permit
systems fall inherently subject to the "commodification" argument 
be-
cause they necessarily give rise to stand-alone 
fungible rights to de-
grade the environment. There are two problems 
with this argument:
First, a tradable pollution permit system need 
not be structured so as
to give rise to purely fungible rights, and second, 
other environmental
regulatory regimes can, and in practice generally 
do, give rise to rights
to pollute that are fungible in certain ways.
Third, I consider the argument that market-based 
environmental
regulatory instruments are particularly susceptible 
to the "commodifi-
cation" critique because of the explicit transactional 
mindset that such
instruments develop. I argue that other environmental 
regulatory ap-
proaches also can, and in practice generally do, 
incorporate a market-
113 Instructive in this regard is the opinion 
of the United States Tax Court in Beatty
v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 835 (1966). At issue in Beatty was 
a liquor license issued by
the state of Arizona. When the petitioners 
purchased their license in 1959, it was
freely transferable. Subsequently, in 1961, the 
state amended the law such that liquor
licenses were no longer freely tradable, but 
could only be transferred "as part of a
bona fide bulk sale of the entire business and 
stock in trade." Id. at 836-37.
The petitioners argued that they were entitled to 
a loss for the purchase price as
a result, inter alia, of the loss of the right to alienate 
their license. The court rejected
this argument. It concluded that the change 
in state law had "not destroyled]" the
right to transfer, reasoning that "the right of 
transfer could still be exercised, albeit
only in connection with a bulk sale of the entire 
business and stock in trade." Id. at
841. And, the court specifically noted that, 
"[s]ince the 1961 amendment, there
bald] been transfers of [state liquor] licenses through 
bulk sales of entire businesses."
Id. at 838.
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based element-in the form of cost-benefit analysis as performed by
the regulator. I further recognize that the perceived attenuation be-
tween cost-benefit analysis and non-market-based environmental tools
serves to confirm the greater applicability of the "commodification"
critique to market-based approaches. At the same time, however, I
suggest (and argue more fully below' 14) that that attenuation may be
to some degree at least a product of framing.
1. Alienability
I begin by addressing the argument that tradable pollution per-
mit regimes are especially and inherently subject to the "commodifica-
tion" critique because they, alone among regulatory approaches, give
rise to alienable property-based rights. But, as I have discussed above,
other environmental regulatory regimes also give rise to property
rights that are alienable-they are alienable along with the underlying
property of which they are a part.11 5 On this basis, moreover, a dis-
tinction can be drawn between the pollution rights and other items
against which a commodification critique has historically been lodged.
Consider, for example, blood. Blood today is to some degree tradable
as a stand-alone commodity, free and clear of the body from which it
originates. 1 6 Still, blood is not alienable as part of the body, since the
body itself is not alienable.' 17 In this sense, property rights in blood-
114 See infra Part V.B.2.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
116 The development of markets for blood was critiqued in Ric-HARI M. TITMUSS,
THE Girr RELATIONSHIP (1971).
Note that, while blood is alienable as a stand-alone commodity, that is not in
general true about other body parts. See MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. R~v. 957, 966 (1982) (noting that blood and certain other body parts are
alienable, but also that most other body parts are not generally considered to be alien-
able). On the general topic of alienability of and markets in body parts, see STEPHEN
WILKINSON, BODIES FOR SALE (2003);Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue,
86 VA. L. REv. 163 (2000); see also Heather R. Kolnsberg, An Economic Study: Should We
Sell Human Organs?, 30 INT'L J. Soc. ECON. 1049 (2003) (questioning the long-run
economic benefit of organ selling).
117 To the extent that a system recognizes slavery and transactions involving slaves,
it is possible for a body to be alienable. Even there, however, there is a difference-
the body would not be purchased or sold for the blood it contains, and the blood
would not enhance the value of the body being traded. Cf YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 105-13 (2d ed. 1997) (analyzing the question of slaves
as property). Markets for babies-another commodification the advisability of which
commentators have debated, compare, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7J. LEGAL STrD. 323 (1978) (advancing the notion
of such markets), with Margaret Jane Radin, What, f Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Sell-
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which arise only once the blood is separated from the body' 18-are
distinct from property rights to which environmental regulation gives
rise-which are alienable along with the underlying property even if
they are not separated from the underlying property.
2. Fungibility
I now address the view that tradable pollution permit regimes
necessarily generate completely fungible pollution rights and, as such,
are inherently subject to the "commodification" argument. To be
sure, under extant regimes tradable pollution permits are entirely fun-
gible. To appreciate this extreme fungibility, consider the notion that
tradable pollution permits result from the partition of preexisting
property into a base asset and a permit or series of permits. t1 9 If parti-
tioning provided the entire explanation for the genesis of tradable
pollution permits, then holders of property who received
"grandfathered" permits would hold, if now in distinct pieces of prop-
erty, the same "bundle of rights" that they held before-or, perhaps
ing?, 26 PAC. L.J. 135 (1995) (questioning the advisability of such markets) -similarly
present a situation inapposite to markets for environmental degradation.
118 SeeJ. E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA, L. REV. 711,
803 (1996) ("[T]he connection of our bodily parts with our bodies shows why they are
not, in general, regarded as our property, even though they are clearly protected by
duties of non-interference, and even though our rights to them are 'alienable,' given
that we can waive a fight to assault, releasing others from these duties, say, to let a
surgeon do a biopsy. Until quite recently, technology did not prompt us to consider
doing without them, much less passing them around. We did not therefore regard
our connection to them as contingent: They could not just as well be someone else's
body parts."); Radin, supra note 116, at 966 (noting that it "seemls] appropriate to
call parts of the body property only after they have been removed from the system"
(footnote omitted)).
119 Note that partitioning is not a necessary part of the genesis of tradable pollu-
tion permits. Partitioning will be a necessary part of the process only if, before the
advent of the permits, preexisting property rights were understood to convey to their
holders the right to engage in activities that resulted in pollution. If that is not the
case-for example, if the government decides to authorize activities that previously
were prohibited or if the activities were not previously undertaken (not because they
were prohibited, but perhaps because of insufficient technological support)-then
the tradable pollution permits are completely new property. For example, the gov-
ernment's recent auctions of new broadcast spectra, see Nash, supra note 23, at 507,
can be seen as the generation of new property interests, see, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Posses-
sion as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 73, 75 (1985) (identifying "space on the
spectrum of radio frequencies" as a "'fugitive' resource" that has been "reduced to
property for the first time" (footnote omitted)).
Historically, however, that has not been the case; usually preexisting property
rights accounted for the rights later authorized by pollution permits. In the text, I
focus on that more common setting.
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more accurately in light of the fact that most tradable 
pollution per-
mit schemes seek to reduce the level of pollution 
emissions, some
proper subset of the bundle of rights they held 
previously. But in fact,
the holder has something more: The holder now 
has an individuated
right that he or she can sell independent of the 
underlying base as-
set. 120 That is, not only does the holder have a 
new piece of property
that he or she can sell independent of the 
underlying asset (from
which the permit originated), but the new asset is an 
asset that, if con-
veyed, will confer upon the buyer a new right 
to do something to the
buyer's preexisting property-that is to say 
that the holder's new asset
is fungible.12 1
But that extent of fungibility is not inherent 
in tradable pollution
permit regimes; it is, rather, a design choice. 
To demonstrate this, I
remain with the example of a property holder 
who, before a partition
of her property, enjoys the right generally to use her 
property as she
sees fit; I compare the situation in which 
the holder voluntarily parti-
tions her property
122 with the involuntary partition effected by 
the cre-
ation of tradable pollution permits with 
grandfathering. Specifically,
let us say that Wally, the owner of Whiteacre, 
sells Betty the right to
remove lumber from Whiteacre. As a result, 
Betty as the holder of
that right has the right to remove lumber 
from Whiteacre. Betty does
not enjoy the right to remove lumber from any other 
plot of land-
not even from Blackacre, land she herself 
owns, if she previously has
granted the right to remove lumber from 
Blackacre to someone else.
In short, the right to remove lumber from Whiteacre 
is transferable,
but it is not fungible.
Pollution permit trading systems in theory 
could be structured in
much the same way. Say, for example, that 
the government seeks to
regulate disposal of hazardous wastes 
by issuing permits to actors;
120 This would seem to be a valuable addition 
to the holder's estate. But cf An-
drus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (establishing 
that federal regulation that
prohibited commercial transactions in parts 
of birds legally killed before laws prohib-
ited killing did not trigger the protection 
of the Takings Clause).
121 In fact, there are different ways in which 
property can be fungible. Below, I
draw a distinction between the fungibility that 
is the discussion of the present discus-
sion in the text (to which I refer as "market-fungibility") 
and fungibility based upon
differences in damage caused by emissions 
in different places (to which I refer as
"degradation-fungibility"). See infra notes 124-35 and 
accompanying text.
122 Law may limit the ways in which property holders 
may partition their property,
at least in terms of the property interests 
to which the partition may give rise. See
generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, 
Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE 
L.J. 1 (2000) (noting that a central
purpose of property law is to limit the freedom 
to define legally enforceable property
interests).
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each permit authorizes its holder to dispose of 
one ton of hazardous
wastes on its land. The permits are tradable. The 
government might
structure the permits to adhere to the real property nature 
of the bun-
dle from which they were partitioned. In this 
case, each permit would
authorize its holder to dispose of one ton of hazardous 
wastes on the
land in respect of which the permit originally was issued. Thus, if 
Wally
obtains a permit from the government and then 
sells that permit (un-
used) to Betty, then Betty (as the new holder of the permit) 
obtains
the right to dispose of one ton of hazardous waste 
on Whiteacre. As
in the lumber example above, the permits, though 
freely tradable, are
not fungible-the right that each permit conveys 
to its holder de-
pends upon the land in respect of which it was 
originally issued.
But that is not the way tradable pollution permit 
regimes gener-
ally are structured: Tradable pollution permits 
are fungible. Remain-
ing with the hazardous waste disposal example, 
each permit would
authorize its holder to dispose of one ton of hazardous 
wastes on any
land that the holder owns. Thus, if Wally sells a permit 
to Betty and Betty
owns Blackacre, then the permit authorizes 
Betty to dispose of one
(additional) ton of hazardous waste on Blackacre. Under 
such an ap-
proach, all permits are entirely fungible: It matters 
not the source of
the permit that Betty purchases-the rights she 
obtains by virtue of
her purchase will be identical regardless of source.
If a tradable pollution permit regime is implemented 
that returns
back to their original holders-i.e., grandfathers-all 
pollution rights,
then a factory owner A can convey to another 
factory owner B a right
that A could not have conveyed to B before the 
partition: the right to
use B's factory more than B could have without 
the right. Moreover,
note that A could not have conveyed that right 
to B before the parti-
tion even if A sold B her entire interest in her 
factory. That would
only allow B to use what had been A's factory; 
that transaction would
have no impact on B's ability to use the factory 
that he had owned
even before the transaction. Even though they 
originated as part of
an interest in real property, the permits under this 
typical structure thus
convey rights along the lines of personal property.
123 No longer are the
rights tied to particular plots of land; the purchaser 
obtains the same
rights, since the permits are fungible.
123 In this regard, compare, for example, how 
the use of a 'profit a prendre' can
convert what had been portions of real property 
into personal property. See, e.g., 63C
AM. JUR. 2D Property § 21 (1997) (" [R]eal property 
in the form of mineral rights or a
profit a prendre is transformed into personal 
property when the physical substance is
severed from the land." (footnote omitted)).
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To this point, I have demonstrated that tradable pollution per-
mits need not be as fungible as the common wisdom suggests that they
must be. In this sense, the notion that tradable pollution permit re-
gimes are inherently subject to the "commodification" critique by vir-
tue of the fungibility of the permits is at least somewhat suspect. But
there is a further point on the fungibility score: While regimes other
than tradable pollution permit regimes may not give rise to fungible
property that is exchangeable on a market-that is, they do not ex-
hibit what I will refer to as "market-fungibility"-still, these other envi-
ronmental regulatory regimes can also, and generally do, feature a
certain aspect of fungibility. They tend to exhibit what I will refer to
as "degradation-fungibility."
Before proceeding, let me explicate the distinction between
"market-fungibility" and "degradation-fungibility."'124 Market-fungibil-
ity is the species of fungibility I have to this point been discussing. It
exists where pollution rights are separated from any underlying prop-
erty interest, such that it does not matter which permit someone
purchases; any permit would convey upon the purchaser the same
rights. Market-fungibility, as I have described above, rests on the valid-
ity of dissociating a right from the particular underlying property with
which it previously was associated. In other words, partitioning is a
necessary prerequisite to market-fungibility, meaning that all market-
fungible regimes are tradable pollution permit regimes. 25
Market-fungibility is to be distinguished from degradation-fungi-
bility. I use "degradation-fungibility" to refer to a regulatory regime's
general failure to treat emissions that cause varying amounts of dam-
ages at different times and locations differently. That is, a regulatory
regime is degradation-fungible if it regulates two emissions of the
same amount of a pollutant equally without regard to whether the
location and extent of the harm caused by the emissions are the same.
By way of illustration, the first hypothetical system that I de-
scribed above126 (involving tradable permits to dispose of hazardous
124 Both types of fungibility square with Margaret Radin's inclusive understanding
of fungibility. See RADIN, supra note 57, at 118 ("By fungibility, I mean at least that the
things are fully interchangeable with no effect on value to the holder."); id. at 118-20;
see also U.C.C. § 1-201 (b) (18) (A) (2006) (defining "fungible goods" as goods of which
"any unit, by nature or usage of trade, is the equivalent of any other like unit"); cf
Schauer, supra note 56, at 1217-19 (noting instances in which things that are claimed
to be "the same" nonetheless are substantially different from one another).
125 Note that the converse is not true, insofar as the first hypothetical system that I
described above (involving tradable permits to dispose of hazardous wastes) is not
market-fungible. See supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
126 See id.
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wastes) is degradation-fungible if it treats disposals of wastes that cause
different types of damage (insofar as damage caused will depend
upon the particular wastes disposed of, as well as the features of the
specific disposal locations) the same way by, for example, conferring
on each landowner precisely the same number of disposal permits in
the first instance. More generally, any environmental regulatory re-
gime may, and in fact many do, improperly equate actions that cause
different environmental harms. Command-and-control systems gen-
erally treat pollution sources in the same way-or, to the extent they
do not, they do not discriminate based upon factors likely to corre-
spond to differences in environmental harm. 2 7 Environmental tax
regimes generally impose a uniform tax rate and thus do not take into
account differences in environmental damage that different emissions
might cause. 128 Information-based regimes generally impose the
same disclosure requirements on all polluters and emissions for each
pollutant.129
Note that the set of environmental regulatory regimes that is mar-
ket-fungible overlaps with the set of regimes that is degradation-fungi-
ble, but also that the two sets are distinct, As Table 1 reflects, there
are regimes that are market-fungible but not degradation-fungible,
and there are regimes that are degradation-fungible but not market-
fungible. Indeed, not all tradable permit systems are degradation-fun-
gible. For example, an ambient permit system is market-fungible but
not degradation-fungible. Further, systems other than tradable per-
mit systems can be degradation-fungible. For example, a typical tax-
based regime, which imposes the same tax rate on all emissions of a
non-global pollutant, is degradation-fungible (since it fails to treat dif-
ferently pollution emissions that cause different amounts of damage
at different locations) but not market-fungible; the same is true of a
127 For example, the Clean Air Act imposes stricter standards on new emission
sources. See Clean Air Act, §§ 165, 169, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479(i) (2000); see also
Nash, supra note 23, at 518 (stating that existing environmental laws place higher
standards on new plants than on existing ones). But it is older sources that are more
likely to be out-of-date and "dirtier," and thus to cause larger environmental damage.
See id. at 515 & n.199.
128 But see supra note 97 (discussing the possible use of a variable tax rate to ad-
dress this problem).
129 At the same time, one might expect public reaction to the disclosure to be
greater where the possible environmental damage is likely to be greater. In that
sense, the programs, combined with the public involvement that the programs antici-
pate, to some degree take into account differences in environmental harm.
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typical command-and-control regime that ignores differences in pollu-
tion damage caused by different emissions.' 30
TABLE 1. MARKET-FUNGIBILITY AND DEGRADATION-FUNGIBILITY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY REGIMES
Market- Degradation-
Type of Regime Fungible? Fungible?
Typical Emission Permit Trading Regime Yes Yes
Ambient Permit Trading Regime Yes No
Hypothetical Hazardous Waste Disposal Permit
Trading Regime Depends* Yes
Typical Tax Regime No Yes
Source-Specific Tax Regime No No
Typical Command-and-Control Regime No Yes
See supra Part IV.B.2.
While market- and degradation-fungibility are distinct concepts,
in practice the demands of market-fungibility generally encourage the
acceptance of degradation-fungibility. Society enjoys the full benefits
of pollution trading-that is, cost-effective reduction of pollution-
only where the regime is fully market-fungible.131 But, unless the sys-
tem involves permits for environmental degradation (a possible, but
complicated, option),232 the permits.will simply represent pollution
emissions, and it is unlikely that two emissions of the same amount of
the same pollutant from two different locations (and otherwise under
different conditions) will have the same impact on environmental
quality.133 It still may be possible to allow trading among polluters
located within close proximity to one another, on the theory that the
degradation impact of emissions from polluters located close to one
another will be substantially the same. But, even putting aside the
problems with this approach,13- 4 the fact remains that the imposition
130 SeeJames Salzman &J.B. Ruh], Currencies and the Commodification of Environmen-
tal Law, 53 STAN. L. Rav. 607, 624 n.36 (2000) ("Proxy choice is not solely a challenge
for [environmental trading markets]. We do the same for traditional command-and-
control regulation. The emissions from coal-fired utilities, for example, are limited in
terms of tons of sulfur, not by the net impact from their release.").
131 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 45, at 111 (emphasizing the importance of a "uni-
form homogenous commodity" to a successful marketable permit program).
132 See infra note 145.
133 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 576-80. Note that this is not the case for
so-called "global pollutants." See id. at 576.
134 See id. at 616 ("No matter how much attention the policymaker devotes to con-
structing zonal boundaries in light of topography and wind patterns, emissions of
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of restrictions on the number of viable traders at some point may be-
come so strict that they impede the viable operation of the permit
market. A solution to this problem is to expand the number of viable
traders, but this can only be done by increasing degradation-fungibil-
ity. 135 Thus do the demands of market-fungibility create an incentive
for increased degradation-fungibility.
The distinction between market- and degradation-fungibility is
important because, while both forms of fungibility can serve as the
basis for the "commodification" critique, only market-based fungibility
seems in practice to be so used. I return to the latter point below; 136
for now, I demonstrate that both forms of fungibility can serve to
ground the "commodification" critique.
As an initial matter, it seems clear that the applicability of the
"commodification" critique is at its zenith where both market- and
degradation-fungibility inhere. Thus, a full-fledged traditional trad-
able pollution permit regime is the quintessential regulatory instru-
ment to which the critique applies. 137
Market-fungibility, standing alone, also can serve as a basis for
assertion of the "commodification" critique against a regulatory re-
gime. Consider, for example, the commodification critique in the
context of the hypothetical regulatory regime described above, under
which the government issues permits that allow holders to dispose of
hazardous waste but where the permits, though tradable, remain tied
to particular pieces of land. -3 8 It seems that the critique is less appli-
cable to such a regime, which is degradation-fungible but not market-
fungible: After all, the regime has not given rise to a unified market
for fungible pollution permits, but only to multiple smaller markets
for particular pollution permits. Still, the fact remains that actual
markets in the permits exist, confirming the applicability of the
critique.
Degradation-fungibility, standing alone, can serve as a basis for
assertion of the "commodification" critique as well. An environmental
regulatory regime that is degradation-fungible gives rise to rights to
local and regional pollutants from different locations, even within the zone, are not
equivalent. Rather, they remain spatially differentiated and will have somewhat differ-
ent impacts-in terms of location and magnitude.").
135 See id. at 617. James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl describe this as the "inevitable
tradeoff between fat and sloppy or thin and bland." Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 130,
at 645; see id. at 645-47.
136 See infra text accompanying notes 183-85.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
138 See supra Part IV.B.2.
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pollute 39 that are commensurable along a common 
metric in that the
regulatory regime treats these rights to pollute 
as equivalent (even
though, from the perspective of environmental 
degradation, they are
not) .
For example, a degradation-fungible tradable pollution 
permit
regime "commodifies," in the form of permits, something 
that should
not be a commodity-140 While equating emissions 
of global pollutants
is not problematic, 141 emissions of local and 
regional pollutants are
"spatially differentiated," meaning that the location and extent of
damage an emission causes will vary with the 
location of, and condi-
tions surrounding, the emission.
1 42 Tradable pollution permit re-
gimes for local and regional pollutants 
thus create an
environmentally-unsound commodity to the extent 
that they allow for
unfettered trading of permits between different locations.
143 So, too,
can regimes that improperly equate emissions across 
time or of differ-
ent pollutants give rise to improper commodification.'
144 Moreover,
139 See supra text accompanying notes 99-100 
(indicating that all regimes short of
absolute bans give rise to rights to pollute).
140 On the importance of degradation-fungibility 
to tradable pollution permit re-
gimes, see Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 130. As 
Salzman and Ruhl explain:
[Environmental trading markets] must assume fungibility-that 
the things
exchanged are sufficiently similar in ways important 
to the goals of environ-
mental protection-otherwise there would be no 
assurance that trading en-
sured environmental protection. While the precondition 
of fungibility may
seem self-evident, this core assumption turns 
out to be more problematic
than it first appears.
Id. at 611 (emphasis omitted).
In fact, the degradation-fungibility mandated 
by the trading system may be
wholly inaccurate in terms of the actual environmental 
impacts-that is to say that, in
many situations, the environmental degradation 
authorized by a permit may vary de-
pending upon the identity, location, and other 
characteristics of the holder. See gener-
ally id. at 629-31 (discussing the nonfungible nature 
of the importance of time as
currency units and establishing defined environmental 
protection goals in order to
determine the appropriate currency); Nash & Revesz, supra 
note 29, at 576-614 (dis-
cussing three regulatory programs involving tradable 
emission permits and the effect
that these programs have on the environment); infra text accompanying 
notes 142-43
(stating that local and regional pollutants are environmentally 
unsound commodities
because they differ in location and extent of damage).
141 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 576. 
But see Salzman & Ruhl, supra note
130, at 623 ("In the context of trades among greenhouse gases [ (a 
global pollutant)],
the ideal unit would be marginal cost to society 
from the emission's contribution to
climate change. However, such measures of 
utility cannot be calculated with any cer-
tainty so we rely on a proxy-in this case the 
emission's global warming potential.").
142 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 576-80.
143 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 130, at 627-29.
144 See id. at 629-30.
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such "miscommodifications" are not uncommon among tradable pol-
lution permit regimes; rather, they are the norm. 145
145 E.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 582-614 (describing how existing trad-
able pollution permit programs allow for generally unfettered trades of emissions of
spatially differentiated pollutants).
Environmental economists have proffered proposals to structure tradable pollu-
tion permit regimes so as to address this concern, but each has its drawbacks. Stan-
dard proposals include emissions trading with multiple zones, markets in units of
environmental degradation or (equivalently) ambient permit systems (the latter of
which I discuss in the text just below), and pollution offset markets. See id. at 614-24.
Emissions trading with multiple zones entails division of the regulated region into
multiple trading zones, with the possibility of allowing no interzonal trading, or of
translation factors for interzonal trading; the problem is that, to the extent that the
markets are small enough seriously to address the problem, they may be too small to
sustain trading. See id. at 614-18; Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 130, at 645 (noting the
"inevitable tradeoff between fat and sloppy or thin and bland"); id. at 645-47. Ambi-
ent permit systems feature the trading of units of environmental degradation, not
emissions amounts; they require maintenance of multiple markets (in respect of the
multiple points at which environmental degradation is measured) and, as such, entail
substantial transactions and administrative costs. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at
618-21. Pollution offset markets entail a "single market in emission permits but
[one] in which trades are not effected on a one-to-one basis," id. at 622; they, too, give
rise to substantial transactions and administrative costs, see id. at 621-24.
In short, all these proposals would tend to impose substantial transactions and
administrative costs that may undermine the very market upon which the trading re-
gime relies to achieve its goal of pollution reduction at the lowest possible cost. In-
deed, this is true for the one trading system that (by definition) does create the
proper commodity-an ambient permit system, under which permits entitle their
holders, not to emit a certain amount of pollutant, but rather to engage in an activity
that results in the degradation of the environment at a particular location. See supra
note 140.
Richard Revesz and I recently proposed a modified emission permit trading sys-
tem that would retain the trading of emissions but at the same time would constrain
the environmental degradation that results from improperly equating emissions of
spatially differentiated pollutants from different locations and over time. See Nash &
Revesz, supra note 29, at 624-28. Our proposal relies upon a single market for emis-
sions permits. Receptor points, and acceptable pollution levels at all receptor points
(based, presumably, on concerns of health, welfare, justice, and practicality), would
be chosen. Approval of a trade of permits would be required before the trade could
be consummated. Responsibility for grants and denials of approval would rest with a
website, which would harness a pollution dispersion model. All pertinent data regard-
ing polluters (and prospective polluters) that the model required to predict pollutant
concentrations-including emission locations, stack heights, temperature and veloc-
ity of emissions, and weather and topographical data-would be loaded onto the web-
site. After verification that the initial allocation of permits would not result in
unacceptably high pollutant concentrations, the website would await requests for ap-
proval of trades. In determining whether to grant approval for a trade, the website
would modify temporarily its emissions data to reflect provisionally the shift in permit
use. The website then would use the dispersion model to predict pollutant concentra-
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Moreover, degradation-fungibility is not a problem particular 
to
market-fungible tradable pollution permit regimes. 
As I have ex-
plained above, even a tradable pollution permit regime 
that is not
market-fungible can be degradation-fungible.'
46 And other environ-
mental regulatory regimes can be-and generally 
are--degradation-
fungible but not market-fungible.
147 For example, a command-and-
control regime that imposes a uniform technology 
requirement on
mercury-emitting factories in a certain industry treats 
as equivalent
the emissions of mercury that are allowed to continue 
once the stan-
dard has been met.
To the extent that commensurability is a cornerstone 
of corn-
modification, 148 it would seem, then, that degradation-fungibility
might serve as a basis for assertion of the "commodification" 
critique.
The fact that it does not suggests that perhaps framing 
effects shield
this form of fungibility from the common perception 
of regulatory
regimes; I return to this point below.
149
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis
A final point in relation to commodification and environmental
regulatory regimes is that, while market-based regimes 
are singled out
for giving rise to markets in environmental quality, 
other regulatory
approaches can, and in fact in practice generally do, 
make use of cost-
tions in the wake of the trade. If the model predicted 
that pollutant concentrations
would be at or less than acceptable levels at all 
receptor points, then the website
would grant approval for the trade and retain the 
modified emissions data. If, how-
ever, the model predicted that the pollutant concentration 
at any receptor point (or
points) would exceed acceptable levels, then the website would 
reject the trade and
revert to the pretrade emissions data. Either way, 
the website then would be ready to
consider requests for approval for other trades. 
Id. at 626.
The system we propose would not eliminate the 
commodification issue, but
would substantially limit it, and do so in a way that 
would not give rise to potentially
fatally large transactions and administrative costs. 
See id. at 628-33 (arguing that the
proposed "constrained single-zone emission regime" 
compares favorably with other
tradable pollution permit regime structures). Thus, this aspect 
of the commodifica-
tion issue can be addressed substantially by modifying 
the structure of the trading
system.
146 See supra Table 1.
147 See id.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
149 See infra Part V.B.2.
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benefit analysis 1 50 In short, both market-based and non-market-based
regulatory instruments place a value on the environment
51
At the same time, it is true that markets and market 
rhetoric are
seen to inhere in market-based regulatory approaches, 
while reliance
on cost-benefit analysis under other approaches 
seems far more atten-
uated: After all, it is conducted a priori rather 
than on a case-by-case
basis, and it is conducted by the regulator and 
not by the societal ac-
tors who will make the decision as to whether 
and how much to
pollute.
At the same time, however, the issue of framing 
raises the ques-
tion of the extent to which the attenuation 
is the result of perception,
and in particular whether it is prompted by 
the frames through which
the various environmental regulatory approaches 
are seen. I elabo-
rate on this point in the next 
Part.1 52
V. FRAMING AND THE PERSISTENCE OF THE 
CRITIQUES
The previous Part analyzed the "right to 
pollute" and "coin-
modification" critiques in the light of economic 
reality, and demon-
strated that the "right to pollute" critique applies 
to all environmental
regulatory instruments short of absolute 
pollution bans, while the
"commodification" critique can be seen to apply not only to market-
based instruments, but to other regulatory 
instruments as well. In-
deed, Lior Strahilevitz dismisses the "right 
to pollute" critique of per-
mits as "too simplistic to be satisfying,"
153 while Eric Posner implies
that marketable permits should be unobjectionable since 
they create a
property right that is based upon "a firm's 
norm-grounded entitlement to
pollute 'a little.'"154
150 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, § 304(b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) 
(1) (B) (2000)
(directing the Environmental Protection Agency to consider 
as a factor in determin-
ing the "best practicable control technology currently 
available" the "total cost of ap-
plication of technology in relation to the effluent 
reduction benefits to be achieved
from such application"). For a taxonomical overview 
of various statutory cost-benefit
requirements, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default 
Principles, 99 MICH. L. REv.
1651, 1663-67 (2001).
151 See Stewart, supra note 50, at 198 (Market-based 
regimes "deal with limited
rights to use common resources for disposing 
of residuals generated by socially pro-
ductive activities. The difference between [market-based 
regimes] and command reg-
ulation is the mechanism for allocating these 
usufructory rights. The value that we
place on distant vistas and clean water is 
the same whether the residuals limitations
needed to preserve these environmental values 
are achieved through command regu-
lation or through [market-based regimes]."); supra 
Part 11I.B.
152 See infra Part V.B.2.
153 Strahilevitz, supra note 50, at 1285.
154 Posner, supra note 104, at 1735 (emphasis added).
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Nonetheless, as I have suggested above and describe 
in greater
detail here, economic reality seems to diverge from perception 
in re-
spect of the critiques. The prevailing perception is 
that both critiques
apply particularly to market-based regulation, with 
tradable pollution
permit regimes especially susceptible to the commodification 
critique.
In this Part, I identify framing effects as one source 
of that divergence.
The differing frames through which competing environmental 
regula-
tory instruments are presented, and therefore perceived, 
render some
of those instruments more susceptible to the critiques 
than others, the
reality of the situation notwithstanding. First, I describe 
the natural
frames of the various environmental regulatory approaches. 
I then
turn to the effects of those frames on perception 
of the devices.
A. The Frames of Environmental Regulatory Devices
I focus upon two aspects of framing: the framing 
of acts and ac-
tors, and the framing of outcomes. By the framing of acts and 
actors,
I mean to refer to the set of societal actors, whether public or 
private,
whose acts fall naturally within the frame of the 
regulation. -55 By
framing of outcomes, I mean to refer to whether 
the regulation tends
to frame particular societal actors as experiencing 
a loss or gain by
virtue of the regulation.'
56
Two aspects of framing of acts and actors are salient. 
First, mar-
ket-based regulations tend to frame their effects 
in a way that
marginalizes the role of government: It relegates 
government to issu-
ing pollution rights to societal actors, divorced from 
any substantial
decisionmaking. Second, market-based regulations 
tend to partition
the pollution emissions of a societal actor from the 
socially beneficial
activity that the actor is presumably undertaking. I 
elaborate on each
of these points in turn.
Market-based regulations frame their function in terms 
of individ-
ual cost-benefit-based decisions undertaken by private 
actors; the role
of government is deemphasized.
157 In reality, the government plays a
substantial, important, and active role in establishing 
and administer-
ing market-based regulation. Under a tax regime, 
the government
must establish, collect, and enforce the tax. Under 
a tradable pollu-
tion permit regime, the government must establish 
the ceiling for
155 Cf supra text accompanying note 15 (describing Tversky 
and Kahneman's con-
cept of "framing of acts," Tversky & Kahneman, 
supra note 7, at 454-55).
156 Cf supra text accompanying note 17 (describing Tversky 
and Kahneman's con-
cept of "framing of outcomes," Tversky & Kahneman, 
supra note 7, at 456-57).
157 Anderson et al., supra note 42, at 16 (distinguishing between 
market incentives
and the governmental command-and-control structure).
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overall pollution emissions, allocate the permits, monitor the trading,
and ensure that no source emits more pollutant than its holding of
permits authorizes. Nonetheless, the regimes are framed in a way so
as to emphasize the role of individual actors-in terms of deciding
whether to pay the tax and pollute more, or whether to buy or sell
permits-rather than the role of government.
In contrast, non-market-based regimes frame themselves in terms
of the establishment by the government of a standard (whether tech-
nological or effluent) with which pollution sources must comply. The
focus is on the government's relationship-as rule-setter and en-
forcer-with polluters.
Market-based regulations tend also to frame their function so as
to partition the act of pollution from the underlying activity out of
which the pollution emission originates.'58 For instance, a tax regime
focuses attention on the payment of the tax by a pollution source in
return for the "right" to continue to pollute; little if any emphasis falls
on the activity (presumably beneficial to society) of which the pollu-
tion emissions are byproducts. This is even more the case for tradable
pollution permit regimes, where the focus is on the purchase of per-
mits in order to vindicate a source's "right" to pollute more-or on
the sale of permits that will allow the buyer to pollute more, in ex-
change for which the seller obtains money. In short, the focus is on
the exchange of the permits for money, and not upon the effect of the
permit transfer on either actor's ability to engage in their underlying
societally beneficial activities.
Although, as I have discussed above, all environmental regulatory
devices create "rights to pollute," 59 non-market-based regimes do not
put the focus on those rights. Rather, the focus is on the factory
(i) complying with applicable standards and then, (ii) continuing its
business with the associated pollution byproduct still linked to the un-
derlying beneficial activity, and therefore not subject to a separate and
independent focus.
In terms of framing of outcomes, non-market-based regulations
tend to present the government as imposing a limit or restriction on
polluters' preexisting freedom to pollute. In this sense, to the extent
that people are generally in favor of reductions in pollution emissions,
these regulations are framed as achieving a gain vis-a-vis the status
quo. Even an information-based regime that does not itself restrict
158 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 Y~a L.J. (forthcom-
ing 2007) (manuscript at 40-43) (discussing the analytical import of separating harm
an activity causes from its benefit).
159 See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
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the amount of authorized pollution or impose 
a technology require-
ment does still impose a disclosure requirement; 
at worst, it comes
across as continuing the status quo.
By contrast, market-based regulations tend to 
be understood as
having the government confer pollution "rights" 
on pollution sources.
From the viewpoint that pollution reductions are 
good, these regimes
are framed as achieving a loss. This is because 
the regimes' frame
implicitly adopts a reference point that is not 
the actual status quo:
The reference point is that, but for the market-based 
regulation, pol-
luters would have no right to pollute. In practice, 
the implementation
of a market-based regulatory regime almost always 
results in a reduc-
tion in total pollution as compared to the status 
quo ante, but the
frame of these devices tends to obscure that fact.
B. Framing Effects of Environmental Regulation
With the differing frames of market-based and 
non-market-based
environmental regulatory tools in place, I turn 
to the effects of those
frames and the question of why, economic reality 
notwithstanding, the
"right to pollute" and "commodification" critiques retain particular
vigor with respect to market-based forms of regulation.
1. The "Right to Pollute" Critique
The perceived applicability of the "right to pollute" 
critique to
market-based environmental regulation but not 
other forms of regula-
tion results from the different instruments' frames. 
In particular,
three factors intensify the perceived susceptibility 
of market-based reg-
ulation to the critique: market-based instruments' 
portrayal of govern-
ment as conferring rights on polluters 
rather than restricting
polluters' behavior, market-based instruments' 
depiction of govern-
ment's role as limited to conferring those rights, 
and market-based
instruments' perceived partitioning of pollution 
emissions from the
-underlying activity of which the emissions 
are a byproduct.
First, market-based regulations portray the government 
as confer-
ring rights on polluters, as compared with other 
regulatory forms that
depict the government as taking rights 
away from-i.e., con-
straining-polluters.1
60 This perception lends itself naturally to the
characterization of market-based instruments, 
in contrast to other ap-
proaches, as conferring a "right to pollute" 
on societal actors.
Reinforcing this characterization is the second 
factor, that gov-
ernment's role is limited under market-based 
approaches to confer-
160 See supra Part V.A.
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ring rights upon societal actors. A typical command-and-control
approach conforms to a standard Austinian conception of law's role as
a command from the sovereign backed up by legal sanction for failure
to achieve compliance.t 6 ' In contrast, market-based approaches are
seen to relegate the role of government to conferring "rights" to socie-
tal actors, with the societal actors enjoying the power to choose
whether and how much to pollute. The framing effect, then, is to
portray market-based approaches as imposing "a mere price" with no
sanction. 162
Third, market-based regulations partition perceptually the pollu-
tion right from the underlying property right-i.e., the underlying
beneficial social activity of which the pollution emission is a by-
product. This enhances the perception that the "right to pollute" that
government conveys under market-based approaches is a right to en-
gage in an activity that is divorced from any beneficial activity-i.e., is
divorced of any positive value. In effect, the partitioning conceals the
tradeoff that society makes by allowing some pollution in order to en-
joy the benefits of the socially useful activity that generates pollution
as an unwanted, but (at least at the present time) necessary, by-
product. By removing the explicit tie to any underlying beneficial ac-
tivity, the partitioning encourages a focus on stand-alone pollution,
which seems more of a "pure evil."
This focus lends support to the comparison, advanced by Robert
Goodin, between transactions in stand-alone pollution rights
(whether under a tax or tradable pollution permit system) and sales of
indulgences by the medieval Catholic Church) 63 There, too, there
was a perceived separation between the indulgence and the "bad act"
for which the indulgence supposedly was penitence. The indulgence
proved problematic because of the lack of apparent link between the
indulgence and the "bad act," which undermined the validity of the
indulgence. 164
The view of pollution as a pure evil supports the comparison of
pollution rights with other societal ills such as murder and racial dis-
crimination. The fact remains that pollution is simply not comparable
to murder or racial discrimination. Racial discrimination, for exam-
ple, rightly deserves societal condemnation. An attempt to address
161 See, e.g., James Bacchus, Groping Toward Grotius: The WTO and the International
Rule of Law, 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 533, 537 (2003) ("UJohn] Austin defined a law as a
rule laid down by a sovereign power that can be enforced through a penalty for failing
to obey it.").
162 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
163 See Goodin, supra note 50, at 578-87.
164 See id. at 579-80.
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the problem of racial discrimination by using a market to allocate the
right to discriminate 16 5 or the right to murder' 66 would undermine
the stigma that properly should be associated with discrimination and
with murder, and thus is fraught with problems. Some argue that a
market in pollution rights (and, to a lesser extent, a tax-based regime)
similarly undercuts the government's condemnation of pollution. But
in fact, as discussed above, the two settings are quite different. 67 Pol-
lution is a necessary byproduct of many beneficial activities and ser-
vices; 16 8 racial discrimination1 6 9 and murder simply are not. Thus,
165 See Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CAL. L. REv. 597, 600-03
(1991) (parodying the notion of legislation that would establish a market for racial
discrimination rights); cf. Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 133, 134 (1994) (describing how a market for racial discrimination rights could
be structured, but recognizing at the same time that such a system would "dilute the
law's symbolic condemnation of discrimination," and that "economic analysis has no
theory of the symbolic and education function of law").
166 Cf Penner, supra note 118, at 804. Penner notes:
[O]ne could ... devise a "right not to be murdered" which was property and
thus transferable. One can imagine a society in which only nobles had the
legal right not to be murdered, and where everyone else had to rely on the
morality of their fellows or on self-defense. Imagine that some down-at-heel
nobles discovered that they could legally sell their rights not to be mur-
dered, and did so. This is an example ofan alienable right not to be mur-
dered. But while this is a case of imaginable property, it violates the concept
of property we actually have, in terms of the role it plays for us. We do not
conceive of a property right not to be murdered because our legal right not
to be murdered is notjustified by a title, purchased or not. Our legal right
not to be murdered is based upon considerations about the universal status
of persons. A person is conceived as having the right simply by being a living
human. Such a right cannot be conceived as alienable any more than a per-
son's life can be. One cannot separate one's life from oneself, to abandon it,
give it away, or sell it, because one is one's life, or at least, whatever one is,
one is not the same thing without it.
id. (emphasis omitted).
167 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 263. Sunstein highlights the difference between
racial discrimination, which a flat ban appropriately suggests is illicit and signals that
it is "the sort of practice to be eliminated rather than be brought to some optimal
point," id., and pollution, for which "there is an optimal level of pollution, and it is
not zero, and polluting activity-so long as it is part of a legitimate business, and not
an intentional tort-is not the kind of thing that it is appropriate to delegitimate as
such," id. at 263 n.195.
168 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
169 The modifier "racial" is important. Once we move beyond the setting of racial
discrimination to, for example, gender discrimination, it may be that certain aspects
of particular jobs make those jobs "necessarily" more appropriate for people of one
gender than another; gender discrimination might be described as "necessary" under
such conditions. At the same time, however, what might seem at first to be a "neces-
sary job qualification at one time might turn out instead to have been the product of
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while it is appropriate fully to condemn racial discrimination and
murder, the same is not true of pollution. 70 It might seem appropri-
ate to condemn the release of pollutants in the abstract with no con-
nection to any benefit flowing therefrom, but the conception
underlying this view is unrealistic. The appropriateness of a pollution
emission can only be judged in light of the benefit that results from
the activity that produces the pollution as a byproduct.171
Nonetheless, a market for pollution emissions rights makes it eas-
ier to accept the notion of pollution as a pure evil, akin to racial dis-
crimination, by encouraging the conceptualization of pollution as
detached from any underlying beneficial activity. In effect, a marketa-
ble permit system gives rise to a "disconnect" between the pollution
emissions and the beneficial activity.
These three framing effects blend together to bolster strongly the
perception that the "right to pollute" critique applies more strongly to
market-based mechanisms. Not only does the government afford
(undesirable) societal mores that seemed necessary but in fact were only a prefer-
ence. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir.
1971) (rejecting the defendant's argument, and the trial court's holding, that the fact
that passengers expected, and psychologically required, flight attendants to be female
constituted a valid justification for hiring only female flight attendants).
170 Cass Sunstein explains:
As a first approximation, a flat ban on an activity may well be preferable to a
cash payment for resulting harm, assuming that there are no transaction
costs (such as enforcement expenditures), when and only when the right level of
the underlying activity is zero. The right level of assaults and poisonings seems
to be zero. It would therefore be absurd to allow people to assault and
poison others as long as they are willing to compensate people for the harm.
Such a strategy would be inconsistent with the underlying goal of eliminat-
ing the conduct altogether.
By contrast, the appropriate emissions level for many pollutants is well
above zero. For example, complete elimination of sulfur dioxide emissions
would cause a severe energy shortage-one that would dramatically increase
poverty, health risks, unemployment, and inflation. In this respect, a ban on
sulfur dioxide emissions would be difficult to justify. For those pollutants
whose continued emissions is necessary to achieve desirable social goals, a
fee, designed to bring about the optimal emissions level, makes far more
sense than a ban.
Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DuKE L.J. 607, 635-36 (footnotes omit-
ted); see also Stewart, supra note 50, at 199 ("The discharge within proper limits of
residuals from socially productive activities ... can by no means be equated with sin
or murder or racial discrimination.").
171 This does not mean that absolute bans of particular types of pollution should
be precluded. See supra note 101. Indeed, more generally, it may be that the pollu-
tion that results from a particular activity is so harmful that the activity itself should be
banned.
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rights to polluters rather than taking them away, but (the perception
continues) the government by doing so cedes decisionmaking author-
ity to polluters. And, further, to the extent that the partitioning of
pollution depicts pollution emissions as purely negative, the convey-
ance by the government of "rights to pollute" confirms the notion that
the government thus sets a "mere price" for pollution without estab-
lishing any norm; 7 2 it seems as though, by conferring absolute rights
to pollute, the government is abandoning any anti-pollution norm.
Thus, while Posner speaks of a "norm not to pollute 'too much'" 73-
and, in fact, market-based systems are consistent with such a norm-
the framing effects make it seem that the government is instead not
endorsing any anti-pollution norm at all. 174
2. The "Commodification" Critique
Two framing features render market-based regulatory forms-
and especially tradable pollution permit systems-especially suscepti-
ble to the "commodification" critique: First, marketable permit sys-
tems tend to emphasize the individual power enjoyed by, and
decisions made by, societal actors, and to deemphasize government's
role; other regimes, in contrast, tend to emphasize the government's
role as rule-setter and enforcer. 175 Second, market-based regimes are
seen to decouple pollution from any underlying beneficial activity.
The emphasis under market-based regulation on individual
choice and action, and the deemphasis of the government's role, fos-
ter the perception that market-based instruments commodify the envi-
ronment. While, as I have discussed above, non-market-based
instruments also tend to rely, at bottom, on some version of cost-bene-
fit analysis,1 76 that analysis falls outside the frame through which non-
market-based instruments are pictured. But that is not the case for
172 See supra note 108 and accompanying text; stpra text accompanying note 162.
173 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
174 The absence of government endorsement of an anti-pollution norm may make
it difficult to restore such a norm later. This helps to explain the extreme resistance
on the part of some environmentalists to any market-based mechanisms. Cf Merrill,
supra note 28, at 295 (noting that some "(e]nvironmentalists came to see that... it
was safe to endorse or at least acquiesce in the usage of market mechanisms ...
[where] they would function solely as a means to an end and would not undermine
the environmentalist position regarding the proper metric for setting standards"). (I
am grateful to Lee Fennell for this point.)
175 This framing effect may make tradable pollution permit regimes attractive to
free market adherents who distrust government regulation. (I am grateful to David
Driesen for this point.)
176 See supra Parts I.B., IV.B.3.
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market-based regulation, where cost-benefit analysis and, therefore,
commodification are center stage. Under a tax regime, the focus is on
each actor's decision as to whether or not to pay the tax and pollute
more. Even more so is the focus on private actors' decisions to trans-
act pollution permits under a tradable permit regime.
The fact that market-based regimes are seen to partition pollu-
tion from the underlying activity exacerbates the commodification
problem. On its face, the analysis shifts from a balancing of the bene-
fits of the socially productive goods or activities against the costs of
pollution, to a balancing of the cost of the right to pollute against the
profit that the polluter enjoys by virtue of the polluting act itself, di-
vorced from any societal benefit. The partitioning makes pollution
seem like a pure evil more akin to murder, the application of an eco-
nomic framework to which, while in reality at least somewhat appro-
priate, 17 7 seems highly inappropriate.
The foregoing thus paints the susceptibility of market-based regu-
latory forms to the "commodification" critique as a framing effect.
That conclusion conflicts at least somewhat with the view, advanced by
proponents of the "commodification" critique, that market-based reg-
ulation inherently commodifies-and, by omission, other forms of en-
vironmental regulation do not commodify-the environment. Three
factors support the view that the applicability of the "commodifica-
tion" critique is at least in part due to framing.
177 While Elizabeth Anderson adheres to the view that cost-benefit analysis in-
volves commodification of the environment, she does concede that the environment
presents a different case from other areas where commodification has been seen to be
problematic:
Whereas we neither have a market in human lives nor regard human beings
primarily as economic resources, we do have markets in land, water, animals,
and natural resources. Our dominant relations to these things are eco-
nomic. The choices people make as consumers of environmental goods are
arguably more autonomous than the choices people make as sellers of their
labor power.
ANDERSON, supra note 76, at 203-04; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences,
Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 247-53 (1993) (to the same effect); Sun-
stein, supra note 57, at 786-87, 834-40 (describing two coexistent, yet somewhat in-
consistent, means of valuation for environmental quality and goods); Spaulding, supra
note 82, at 297-98 (describing both market-based approaches and command-and-
control approaches as examples of "incomplete commodification" on the spectrum
between "complete commodification" and "complete non-commodification," with
market-based approaches "Ic]loser to free market environmentalism"). But cf. Acker-
man & Heinzerling, supra note 80, at 1562-81 (critiquing the underpinnings and
methodology of cost-benefit analysis).
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First, Saul Levmore argues that the commodification critique as a
general matter is largely instrumental. 171  He explains that the cri-
tique seems to persist precisely in situations where it is the case (or at
least it is believed to be the case) that the collective weal will suffer as a
result of trading the "commodity" in question. As such, the critique
"suffers from something of a circularity problem." 7 9 Levmore's view
accords well with the notion that the applicability of the "commodifi-
cation" critique results from framing: The way in which the effect on
the public weal is presented, i.e., framed, may fuel-or defuse-criti-
cisms of the proposed commodification.
Second, as I have discussed above, most environmental regulatory
regimes involve some measure of cost-benefit analysis. 180 But the
"commodification" critique is commonly leveled against market-based
regulatory forms. This suggests that the cost-benefit analysis present
in other regimes simply falls outside the pertinent regulatory frame.' 8 '
Third, the absence of criticisms of environmental regulatory in-
struments on degradation-fungibility grounds suggests that the extent
and scope of commodification may be affected by framing. As I have
suggested above,1 8 2 one would expect proponents of the commodifi-
cation critique to be piqued by degradation-fungibility-not specifi-
cally because of the possible development of "hot spots" themselves
(though that raises its own environmental justice concerns' 8 3 ), but
rather because of the fact that those who promulgate degradation-
fungible systems value the existence of a broad market over the selec-
178 See Levmore, supra note 39, at 115-16 & n.8.
179 Id. at 115.
180 See supra Parts III.B., V.B.3.
181 Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart, as well as Cass Sunstein, maintain that
tradable pollution permit regimes are preferable to other environmental regulatory
instruments because of their democratizing features. In particular, they argue that
the tradable permit regimes enhance democracy by promoting a focus on the funda-
mental question of how much pollution should be allowed, as compared with com-
mand-and-control regimes that typically focus on questions, such as the appropriate
technology to be required to achieve pollution reduction, that are far less accessible.
See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 38, at 1352-53; Cass R. Sunstein, Democratiz-
ing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 949, 967 (1991). But, if the frame of
market-based environmental regulatory instruments in fact tends to deemphasize the
role of government, then Ackerman and Stewart's, and Sunstein's reliance upon the
question of the overall level of acceptable pollution as the focal point of market-based
programs is misplaced. Perhaps tradable permit systems do not effectively democra-
tize if their frame does not put emphasis on that question. Cf Heinzerling, supra
note 86 (questioning Ackerman and Stewart's, and Sunstein's democratization asser-
tion on theoretical and empirical grounds).
182 See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
183 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 580-81, 613-14.
[VOL. 82:1
20061 FRAMING EFFECTS AND REGULATORY 
CHOICE 305
tion of a scientifically defensible commodity.
18 4 Market values tri-
umph over other values, the natural argument would 
seem to lie. Yet,
the argument that degradation-fungible systems 
value establishment
of a broad-based commodity over all else is essentially 
absent from the
commodification literature.'
8 5 It thus seems that the frame through
which environmental regulations (in various forms) are 
presented
deemphasizes the question of the particular 
environmental harm
caused by emissions, with the emphasis instead 
on emission amounts.
The frame, in other words, affects the degree to 
which the regulation
is perceived to commodify the environment.
Fourth, in terms of the importance of a frame 
that emphasizes
(or deemphasizes) cost-benefit analysis and commodification, 
a study
conducted by Kip Viscusi in a related area-corporate 
risk analysis
and the award of punitive damages'86-Provides 
a useful analog. Risk
is similar to pollution. Like pollution, the absolute 
eradication of risk
is unattainable and, moreover, undesirable. Further, 
while there is
much public rhetoric on the ideal of reducing risk, 
1 7 in reality the
public is quite willing to accept higher risk for cost 
savings, i.e., for the
benefit of making goods and activities affordable 
that would not be
were risk substantially reduced (let alone completely eliminated)
9 88
184 Note that degradation-fungibility meets the 
description of "fungibility" as an
indicia of commodification in the conceptualization 
offered by Margaret Radin. See
RADIN, supra note 57, at 118; Radin, supra note 
58 at 1880 & nn.115-
17
.
185 On September 23, 2006, a Westlaw search 
of legal journals and treatises for
documents that refer to "commodification" and 
"environmental justice" or "hot
spots" in the same paragraph produced only nine 
results. Vicki Been has suggested
that environmental justice advocates might use a commodification 
argument to assert
that society ought not to allow people to sell 
their right to live away from locally-
undesirable land uses. See Vicki Been, Compensated 
Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay
Attention?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 824 (1994); Vicki Been, 
What's Fairness Got to Do
with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable 
Land Uses, 78 CORNELL
L. REv. 1001, 1040-41 (1993). Norman Spaulding discusses 
'hot spots' under a gen-
eral analysis of commodification and market-based 
environmental regulation. See
Spaulding, supra note 82, at 323 & n.95.
By contrast, an article that presents a taxonomy 
of environmental justice con-
cerns contains no reference to commodification. 
See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of
Environmental Justice, 30 ENvrL. L. RFP. 10,681 (2000).
186 See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: 
A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REv'. 547
(2000).
187 See, e.g., John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert 
Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs,
in RISK vs. RISK 1, 1 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener 
eds., 1997).
188 See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 186, at 548-49. 
Viscusi elaborates:
On a personal level, the approach of accepting 
risk tradeoffs is implicit
in our daily lives. We take chances all the time. 
We ride in motor vehicles,
fly on planes, eat potentially risky foods, and live 
in an environment that is
not risk-free. Some tradeoffs of this kind are inevitable 
as we seek to strike
366 NOT M LAW REVI E W....
Viscusi studied the effect of corporate risk analyses on jury awards
of punitive damages in the context of automobile 
safety design. In
particular, he used surveys of juror-eligible citizens to try, 
among
other things, to isolate the effect on punitive damage 
awards of the
fact that an automobile manufacturer had-or had 
not-conducted a
cost-benefit analysis in respect of a design feature 
that later led to inju-
ries. Viscusi explains that, ideally, one would want 
companies to un-
dertake a systematic risk analysis rather than make 
similar decisions in
a reckless manner.'8 9 But, to the contrary, Viscusi's 
findings indicate
that jurors tend to arrive at larger punitive damage awards when 
com-
panies actually engage in explicit cost-benefit analyses
19° As Viscusi
notes, "It] he resulting incentives are perverse."
u91
Viscusi offers "conjectures' 92 to explain the facially counterintui-
tive behavior of individuals in this setting. Among 
these conjectures is
the notion that "[m] oney and lives might be considered incommensu-
an appropriate balance between the harm inflicted 
by risks and the benefits
such activities offer for our lives. The task for the 
individual is to make those
personal decisions that confer sufficient benefits 
to outweigh the associated
risks.
When faced with options that have different levels 
of safety, we often
pay a higher price for safer products, though not 
without limit. Millions of
consumers purchase cars with antilock brakes and protective 
side air bags,
but few of us have such an unlimited concern for 
safety that we purchase a
tank-like Hummer vehicle.
Id.
189 See id. at 550. Viscusi explains:
[W]e want corporations to think about risks in a systematic 
manner and to
undertake such calculations to ensure that there 
is appropriate risk balanc-
ing that is sufficiently protective. We all benefit 
when corporations select
the level of safety that correctly reflects our own 
concern with safety and the
costs of providing it.
Id. Viscusi elucidates that markets allow corporations 
to gauge the risk tradeoffs that
consumers are willing to accept:
The risk tradeoffs that we are willing to make in 
effect set the price for safety
in the market and provide guidance to corporations, 
which must supply the
products and services we purchase. If corporations 
generate products that
create more hazards than we want to bear given 
the product price, or in-
clude unnecessary safety features that we do not 
value, then the product risk
mix will not be successful in the marketplace.
Id. at 549.
190 See id. at 556-57. Viscusi also found that jurors arrived 
at larger awards when
companies used more accurate, but larger, values 
of life in conducting their cost-
benefit analyses than when they used artificially low values 
of life. See id. at 558. Thus,
the more sound the cost-benefit analysis, the worse 
the likely result for the company.
191 Id. at 588.
192 Id. at 586.
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rable."19 3 If that is so, then "[pleople may be averse to explicitly bal-
ancing money against human lives." 19 4 Along the same lines of the
commodification critique of market-based environmental regulation,
the argument proceeds, it is more acceptable to engage in risk trade-
offs implicitly than it is to do so explicitly by undertaking an explicit
analysis.' 95 Thus, Viscusi's findings provide perhaps some empirical
193 Id. at 587. Viscusi also advances the possibility that the mock jurors might have
been affected by hindsight bias. In other words, the mock jurors might have seen the
corporations as having balanced the costs of improved safety against people-now
identified people, since an accident has by now occurred-who suffered particular
injuries or died as a result of the lower safety provided, whereas in fact all the corpora-
tion did was to compare the costs of improved safety with a number representing the
statistical expected value of harm that would result if the additional safety feature
were not incorporated. See id. at 587-88.
194 Id. at 586-87.
195 Along these lines, compare Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt's explanation
for the vitality of customary or evolutionary approaches (as compared to, inter alia,
market-based approaches) for the distribution of scarce assets. See GuIo CAtLABRESI
& PHILIP BoBsIrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 44-49 (1978). Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that
customary approaches may be valuable because they allocate assets without many of
the costs associated with explicit markets. But they note that, while customary ap-
proaches "are likely to reduce and even avoid the costs of costing[, ... this is accom-
plished by sacrificing honesty and candor. Evolutionary approaches epitomize the
fact that subterfuges do not extinguish the costs of costing, but rather transform them
into costs in honesty." Id. at 146. Cf David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor,
100 HARv. L. REV. 731, 748 (1987) (arguing that such approaches are prescriptively
questionable, and that the "subterfuge can bring us peace only for a while").
Compare as well the Supreme Court's holding in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), that the plain language of the Clean Air Act precludes the
EPA from considering costs in setting national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS"), see id. at 471, with the Court's indication that "secret[ I consider[ation] "
of costs would have to be tolerated (though it would be inconsistent with the Court's
holding), id. at 471 n.4. The Court explained: "Respondents' speculation that the
EPA is secretly considering the costs of attainment without telling anyone is irrelevant
to our interpretive inquiry. If such an allegation could be proved, it would be
grounds for vacating the NAAQS, because the Administrator had not followed the
law." Id. Of course, if in fact EPA indeed considered costs "without telling anyone,"
id., it would be difficult for such an allegation to be proved. By placing the burden of
proof on challengers, the Court in effect provides greater protection for EPA's covert,
as opposed to explicit, considerations of cost.
A distinct, yet somewhat related, point is made by Laurence Tribe in his critique
of the notion of having juries rely too heavily upon mathematical methods. One ob-
jection that Tribe raises to such an approach is that it may dehumanize justice. See
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. Ruv. 1329, 1375-77 (1971). Tribe suggests that extensive reliance on mathe-
matics may render the legal system "even more alien and inhuman than it already...
[seems] to distressingly many." Id. at 1376. He also argues that such an approach will
2oc,6]
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support for the heightened applicability of the commodification 
cri-
tique in the context of actual market-like treatment.
At the same time, Lior Strahilevitz advances his 
study of the ef-
fects of selling the right to use a freeway's express lanes 
as empirical
evidence that the "commodification" 
critique is not always present.'
96
Strahilevitz analyzed a system whereunder drivers 
on the freeway, in
return for a charge, gain access to the freeway's express 
lanes as op-
posed to its local lanes. The charge varies with how 
many cars already
are using the express lanes; higher usage leads 
to a higher user
charge.1 97 Strahilevitz found that people's behavior 
under the system
does not conform to what proponents of the 
commodification cri-
tique might predict.19
8 Strahilevitz argues that the freeway express
lane example is substantially analogous to the use 
of marketable per-
mits to regulate environmental quality.
199
But Strahilevitz's analogy to pollution permits 
is not a strong one
in two important ways. First, those who choose 
to do so pay a one-
time fee, upon admission, to use the express lanes. 
Once they have
gained admission, they cannot sell their 
use right to anyone else.
200
serve only to "shroud[ ] the [legal] process in mathematical 
obscurity," thus render-
ing the trial process and trial outcomes less, 
not more, comprehensible. Id.
196 See Strahilevitz, supra note 50, at 1272.
197 Id. at 1251. But note that there is only a one-time 
charge upon admission. See
id.
198 Strahilevitz explains:
The FasTrak experience does not support the argument 
that a move from a
legal regime prohibiting an undesirable activity 
to one that commodifies the
activity will undermine the norm against that behavior. 
San Diego's increase
in carpooling during the life of the program 
suggests that, if anything, the
norm against solo commuting has become somewhat 
stronger. Carpoolers
have not felt that by commodifying their contribution 
to diminished road-
way congestion FasTrak has trivialized their activities. 
To the contrary, it
appears that those drivers who carpooled before 
the FasTrak program began
to feel that society was providing them with a 
greater reward than it did
beforehand.
Id. at 1289.
199 See id. at 1288-91.
200 Strahilevitz recognizes this, but does not think 
the distinction is ultimately sali-
ent to the question of commodification:
An important distinction [between tradable pollution permits 
and the
San Diego freeway-express lane example] concerns the 
fact that the right for
solo drivers to use the Express Lanes is not, at 
present, alienable. The analy-
sis herein, however, suggests that this lack of 
alienability makes little differ-
ence with respect to norms. Indeed, if anything, 
making access to the
Express Lanes alienable might make carpoolers 
feel that their activities are
valued by the state to an even greater degree, 
since they could then opt for
either time or monetary savings as a result of 
their carpooling choice.
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Indeed, new users purchase their use right from the government, not
from existing users who are exiting the lanes. In this sense, the San
Diego freeway express lane example is more akin to a variable tax
scheme than to a marketable permit scheme. 20 1 No private party en-
joys the opportunity to profit by transacting in express lane use
rights.20 2 In short, the system produces no opportunity for "winners"
to enjoy an economic profit.
In contrast, the case of punitive damages in the wake or absence
of corporate risk analyses is a setting where there are private party
winners. Automobile manufacturers may be viewed (at least after the
fact) as having profited at the expense of those injured or killed in
accidents. In short, the risk analysis setting seems much more hospita-
ble to the commodification critique than does the freeway-express
lane setting. The setting of tradable pollution permits also can be
characterized to raise the specter of private party winners. Thus, it,
too, seems more susceptible to the commodification critique.
More importantly, the "commodity" that Strahilevitz studied-
roadway usage-differs from the "commodity" of tradable permit sys-
tems-environmental degradation-in that roadway usage is not,
standing alone, seen to be a pure evil. By contrast, environmental
degradation-at least standing alone-is seen as a pure evil. There is,
in short, no partitioning of roadway usage from an underlying benefi-
cial activity such that the commodification of roadway usage seems
problematic. (There might be more of a problem if, for example, the
government issued, instead of roadway usage permits, permits to emit
a certain amount of carbon monoxide which it then required drivers
to have before they get to operate their motor vehicles.)
In sum, framing effects do enhance the susceptibility of market-
based forms of environmental regulation to the "right to pollute" and
"commodification" critiques. In the next Part, I turn to the question
of whether, and if so how, the force of these critiques might be
blunted by altering the regulations' frames.
Id. at 1288 n.286.
201 See supra note 97.
202 Cf Levmore, supra note 39, at 114 (describing the basis of the "anti-corn-
modification" objection to vote-selling as the "the idea that voting is a kind of collec-
tive decisionmaking experience, greater than the sum of individual votes, so that
something important is lost if an isolated voting right is sold for the individual seller's
selfish gain").
2006]
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V. REFRAMING AS A MEANS TO DEFUSE CRITIQUES OF MARKET-BASED
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
In the previous Part, I described the "right to pollute" 
and "corn-
modification" critiques of market-based environmental 
regulatory sys-
tems as effects of the frames through which market-based 
systems are
portrayed. The fact that these critiques are, to 
some degree at least,
framing effects suggests that perhaps those 
effects might be mini-
mized by altering the frames. I address that question 
in this Part.
The frame through which a regulation is presented, 
and the ef-
fects of that frame, might be altered either through 
education of the
public to broaden the regulation's natural frame, 
or by changing the
very frame of the regulation itself. Thus, one 
possibility is directly to
instruct the public as to how these schemes 
are supposed to func-
tion,203 and to demonstrate that they in fact 
do not compromise the
government's commitment to environmental 
protection. 20 4
Another avenue would be to alter the frame itself 
by changing the
nomenclature of market-based systems. For 
example, tradable permit
systems generally refer to the rights they create 
as emissions permits
or allowances. While the systems often disclaim 
the property nature
of the allowances 2 5-in part to address the concern 
that the system is
creating "property rights to pollute"20
6- the fact remains that the al-
lowances' moniker connotes an absolute 
right to emit a certain
amount of pollutant.
20 7
203 See Nash, supra note 23, at 531 (suggesting that the 
argument might be largely
defused by having the government "explain[ ] to the 
public how [the] tradable pollu-
tion allowance regime is supposed to function").
204 The promise of education as a tool is 
supported by the fact that society has
acclimated over time in other contexts to new 
independent property rights that origi-
nally drew significant opposition. See, e.g., 
Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in
the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 273, 333-35 (1991) (describing
the successful expansion, over opposition, 
of new forms of intangible property in
Great Britain and the United States).
205 For example, the statutory scheme in 
the Clean Air Act explicitly provides that
a sulfur dioxide emission allowance constitutes 
only a "limited authorization to emit
sulftir dioxide," and does "not constitute a 
property right." Clean Air Act § 403(f), 42
U.S.C. § 765hb(f) (2000).
206 Congress evidently adopted this approach 
both to provide leeway were it to
decide in the future to modify or eliminate 
the rights conveyed by the allowances, and
to minimize the appearance of conveying 
property interests in a "right to pollute."
Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 584 n.
7 3
.
207 Indeed, one might argue that the current 
nomenclature-if not the current
state of the law itself-suggests that a polluter 
who possesses an emissions allowance
could emit the amount of the pollutant 
even if the polluter was engaged in no beneficial
activity, i.e., the polluter could simply open 
a canister of air pollutant for no reason
other than that she was legally authorized 
to do so. A change in the nomenclature
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To address this problem, Carol Rose has suggested that 
permits
instead be dubbed "emissions debits" or 
"emissionS penalties."
208 Per-
haps a more satisfying-and more effective-approach 
would be to
focus the permit's moniker on the right to use the 
underlying prop-
erty in a way that results in the generation 
of pollution as a by-
product.209 Such an approach would retain 
the notion that the
pollution emission ties back to some beneficial 
activity, despite the
partitioning of the pollution "right" from the 
underlying property
right. It also would serve to emphasize the fact 
that other forms of
environmental regulation also balance pollution 
emissions against
beneficial activities, and thus themselves engage in 
commodification.
It is possible that, as a result of cumulative framing 
effects to this
point, an anti-market-based norm has developed and 
ensconced itself.
If that is true, then simple education or relabeling 
of programs will
likely not be successful in overcoming objections to market-based 
reg-
ulation. More intense educational efforts might 
be required to effect
norm transformation.
210
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the different frames 
through
which different regulatory instruments are presented 
may affect the
perception of those instruments, and in turn may 
influence the choice
among those instruments. I have used the "right 
to pollute" and
"commodification" critiques that are typically lodged against market-
based environmental regulatory systems as an example. 
The critiques
in reality apply to most environmental regulatory tools, 
yet the percep-
tion is that they do not. I have argued that three aspects 
of regulatory
framing-market-based regulations' emphasis on 
individual actors as
opposed to government, their partitioning of 
pollution emissions
from the underlying beneficial activity, and their 
portrayal of polluters
as gaining, rather than surrendering, rights-contribute 
to this per-
would dispel, properly, any suggestion that such 
behavior would be tolerated (let
alone authorized).
208 Rose, supra note 99, at 36.
209 Thus, a more accurate, though perhaps too 
cumbersome, moniker might be
"permit to use property in a way that results in an incidental pollution emission."
210 Cf Posner, supra note 104, at 1730-31 (discussing the 
possible use of educa-
tion to alter people's norms). But cf id. at 1734-35 (noting 
that, because "[n]o
amount of education and government-sponsored 
television commercials are going to
prevent paper mills from spewing forth pollution," 
the answer instead was to "circum-
vent" the "weak norm" against polluting the air 
by "transform[ing] a firm's norm-
grounded entitlement to pollute 'a little' into a property 
right that can be traded on
the market").
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ception such that the perceived susceptibility of market-based instru-
ments to these critiques is at least in part a framing effect. I have also
suggested some ways that the framing effects might be mitigated.
This Article provides three important lessons. First, at least some
of the objections to market-based environmental regulation result
from framing. Mitigation of these framing effects might make enact-
ment of market-based regulation more politically viable.
Second, on a broader level, an understanding of the "commodifi-
cation" critique of market-based environmental regulation as a fram-
ing effect suggests that perhaps other applications of that critique also
might result from framing. In this sense, framing effects may shed
light on the proper scope of "commodification," a scope that has
proven difficult to understand. 21'
Third, speaking even more broadly, the importance of framing
on environmental regulatory-instrument choice indicates that framing
effects may play an important role in instrument choice generally. Re-
search into the breadth of such effects, as well as the degree to which
framing effects in fact may sway public opinion, would be worthwhile.
211 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 39, at 115-16 & n.8; Note, The Price of Evelything,
the Value of Nothing: Refraning the Commodification Debate, 117 HARv. L. REV. 689 (2003).
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